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This study applies extant theories of property rights change to three land tenure systems in Imperial Ethiopia. Two of the areas underwent changes in property rights after experiencing changes in the value of land; one did not. A data set of litigation over land rights is used in conjunction with case studies to understand the mechanisms motivating or impeding property rights change. Amendments to the role of the state are suggested and two conclusions are reached: (1) that movement towards greater specificity of land rights did not always occur; and (2) the changes in property rights that occurred were imposed from above, rather than occurring endogenously. Where property rights changes did not occur, they appear to have been blocked by the state, which was more concerned with political survival than with revenue maximisation.
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE: EVIDENCE FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA
The institutions that undergird the functioning of markets in the developing world have come under scrutiny as efforts at development have been less effective than scholars have predicted. While modes of exchange and state/society relations are key to understanding political and economic systems in the developing world, so too are the existing systems of property rights. This article seeks to test and expand the economic theory of property rights with quantitative evidence from litigation in Africa.
The article will begin with a very brief sketch of the extant theory of property rights emphasising its applied branch of induced institutional innovation. The mid-section of the article details two historic case studies: Sidama and Hamasien, both areas of Imperial Ethiopia where property rights change occurred when the model predicts, but not in the manner predicted. The final section of the paper investigates what happened in a third area of Imperial Ethiopia that did not correspond to the model of property rights change. I begin with some definitions.
Scholars generally define institutions as rules, traditions or conventions that govern behaviour. They can be formal, as in the case of codified laws, or they can be informal, as is often true of traditional rules and customs. Because they govern behaviour in a society, institutions play a role as essential as factor endowments in the economic functioning of a society. Even in...