When is coercion---the use of threats to influence another's behavior---successful in the long term? The literature on coercion, although substantial, shows little consensus on what qualifies as a successful example of coercion. This shortcoming seems to originate in several deficiencies in the literature. Many authors have argued that coercion (or coercive diplomacy) is attractive to policy makers because it offers an alternative to war. Yet, how can coercion be viewed as an alternative to war, when people do not know if it can lead to a lasting peace because there is no agreement on success? This dissertation seeks to determine the characteristics and factors that facilitate the use of coercion to reach a durable peace.
Three hypotheses will be tested: (1) the more accurate the image the coercer has of the target state, the more likely the coercive strategy will lead to favorable outcomes; (2) the greater the relative power differential, the easier it is for the coercer to be magnanimous; and (3) the greater the difference in political commitment, the easier it is for the "winner" to be generous. In order to test these hypotheses, two cases of coercion will be examined: (1) the 1961 Laos Crisis; and (2) the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
In the Laotian case, coercion appeared at first to be successful, but was short-lived and Laos again lapsed into civil war. In the second case, not only was coercion successful, but it also led to a lasting understanding about Cuba between the United States and the Soviet Union.Where the coercer has: (1) a correct image of the target, (2) greater relative power than the target, and (3) a greater political commitment, then it should be easier for the coercer to make a settlement with the target that proves to be lasting.
My Research