Abstract

Saying something that is both true and intelligible about Kant's views on logic requires sensitivity to three sorts of interpretive concerns, corresponding to the expectations of three sorts of potential audiences. Kant-scholars will demand a sensitivity to the internal constraint of consistency with the rest of Kant's philosophical architectonic. Those working on modern philosophy will demand a sensitivity to the fact that the technical terms of Kant's logic have had a very specific meaning conferred upon them by developments in the late Scholastic and Early Modern periods, a meaning which often-times is quite distinct from (or even at odds with) present-day usage. Nevertheless, present-day philosophers of logic will demand that, if Kant's views are to be taken seriously, they should be able to be framed in a way that allows for dialogue with the most promising views currently on offer.

In the present work, I aim to be responsible to all three demands, and so engage with all three sorts of readers. The payoff of sensitivity on these several fronts is significant indeed, for it will show that many widely-held beliefs about Kant's views on logic are gravely mistaken and unfounded. I have in mind here primarily the beliefs that: (1) Kant simply inherits and repeats what the tradition has taught about logic since Aristotle, (2) his logical doctrines carry little weight in his philosophical system, and (3) his views have been so thoroughly superceded by more recent work (e.g., by Frege) that they are unable to contribute anything to contemporary debates. My thesis demonstrates that, to the contrary, Kant's views on logic: (1*) though essentially indebted to his (especially Rationalist) predecessors, are clearly innovative in relation to them, (2*) are absolutely central to his Critical project (both in its content and in its methodology), and (3*) directly engage foundational discussions in present-day philosophy of logic.