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Federal low-income tax credits are pertinent to fair market value, and the discounted cash flow method and rental capitalization method are allowable in determining fair market value (of low-income housing). Pine Pointe Housing v. Lowndes County, (2002), is discussed.

Federal low-income tax credits are pertinent to fair market value, and the discounted cash flow method and rental capitalization method are allowable in determining fair market value (of low-income housing).

Pine Pointe Housing v. Lowndes County. 561 S.E.2d 860 (Ga.App. 2002 [March 12]).

The taxpayer appealed its assessment to the county board of equalization, and the county board of tax assessors appealed the decision of the board of equalization to the superior court. The court established the property's fair market value, and the taxpayer appealed. The court of appeals affirmed.

The taxpayer claimed that the trial court erred in using an allocation of low-income housing tax credits under Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code in determining the property's fair market value. The court of appeals disagreed, pointing out that the credits can be passed through a partnership structure to purchasers. Furthermore, the credits are linked to restrictive covenants that required the property to charge below-market rent. If viewed in isolation, the rental restrictions would artificially depress the property's value. The taxpayer also claimed that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict because the board of tax assessors failed to present a permissible method for establishing fair market value. The court held that the allowable method for conducting an appraisal was not as restrictive as the taxpayer contended. Finally, the taxpayer claimed that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss because the board failed to ensure a timely hearing of its appeal to the superior court. The court noted that failure to try an action at the first term is not fatal if a reasonable excuse or reasonable delay is shown. The board's appeal to the superior court was not heard at the first term of court following its filing, and the taxpayer had agreed to a continuance. During the first term, the taxpayer had not completed its response to the board's discovery requests. The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion. The superior court's decision was affirmed.