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Nearly four years after September 11, the impact of terrorism on urban design and planning has been subtle-although some experts still worry about overkill. Among them are people whose job it is to recommend and review security strategies for major facilities. Standards and guidelines have emerged to help builders and property managers sort through security issues, starting with a remarkably well-accepted strategy of blending perimeter security measures with streetscape elements such as plinth walls, benches, and lampposts that have been hardened with steel. Hundreds of big city businesses have set up "redundant" backup facilities in the suburbs, and some have left downtowns altogether, according to commercial real estate tracking groups. But the impacts of security requirements-now becoming as common as sprinkler systems, or handicapped access, or earthquake absorption features in California-are being seen in less obvious ways. Security strategies, recommendations, and standards that have emerged since 2001 include some that are essentially voluntary, such as the National Capital Planning Commission's, although the commission does have the authority to approve or disapprove specific projects. Mandatory standards are those of the Interagency Security Committee, which apply to all new federal buildings and major modernization projects controlled by the GSA and the DOD-for new construction, new and renewed leases, and rehabilitation projects. The agencies' authority extends over buildings they either own or lease.

In the months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the predictions were dire: In the rush to protect the country's buildings, landmarks, and infrastructure from future acts of terrorism, it was said that people would scramble to move out of the bull's-eye, just as urban America was making a comeback. Cities would empty out.

The symbols of fear were everywhere: the Jersey barriers, builders fretting about the cost of making structures terror-resistant-harder to destroy, less lethal when damaged, easier to escape from-and the federal government encouraging decentralization and dispersal outside the major cities. Some companies, including Fidelity and Morgan Stanley, moved workers out of Manhattan.

Flash forward to 2005. Nearly four after September 11, the impact of terrorism on urban design and planning has become more subtle-although some experts still worry about overkill. Among them are people whose job it is to recommend and review security strategies for major facilities.

Rethinking the strategy

Standards and guidelines have emerged to help builders and property managers sort through security issues, starting with a remarkably well-accepted strategy of blending perimeter security measures with streetscape elements such as plinth walls, benches, and lampposts that have been hardened with steel. Making building components less lethal in an explosion has been accomplished in part with relatively inexpensive materials such as shatter-resistant plastic film coatings on windows.

New York's revised building codes and changes in life safety standards include mostly commonsense steps, like hardening and widening stairways in tall buildings and changing structural designs to prevent a total collapse.

Hundreds of big city businesses have set up "redundant" backup facilities in the suburbs, and some have left downtowns altogether, according to commercial real estate tracking groups. But others, like Goldman Sachs, have recommitted to lower Manhattan, and demographers can't document any pattern of residents leaving the city for security reasons.

But the impacts of security requirements-now becoming as common as sprinkler systems, or handicapped access, or earthquake absorption features in California-are being seen in less obvious ways.

Second generation concerns

Experts in security and design say the field has gone through a first generation of concerns, and today most government agencies and private property managers see the value of replacing Jersey barriers with more permanent and visually pleasing protective measures. Still fearful of explosive-laden vehicles, however, both private and public property managers are still demanding big setbacks, street closures, and off-site, above-ground parking, all of which clash with traditional principles of urbanisai, particularly in areas of new construction or redevelopment.

A telling episode occurred in Washington's Southeast Federal Center, a 42-acre overhaul of industrial and vacant land in the Anacostia waterfront district-a new frontier for mixed-use development in a city that continues to draw new residents. The effort got a big boost when the U.S. Department of Transportation announced in August 2001 that it would relocate to a redevelopment site south of M Street, between the Navy Yard and what is now the proposed home for Washington's new major league baseball team.

The General Services Administration's development team commissioned architect Michael Graves to design the new headquarters, part of an overall effort led by real estate developer Forest City Enterprises and SMWM Architects. The promise of a walkable, compelling cityscape was at hand.

But then some preliminary designs came in, and the planners in charge of reviewing them for the federal government and the city saw that DOT wanted a 50-foot setback, right in an area where pedestrian activity was being encouraged. Ground floor retail was also firmly rejected in some spots. And federal officials said they could not possibly allow a street to be reestablished through the site-one of the key streets the city sought in order to revitalize the old street grid.

"How do you create a vibrant urban area with that kind of setback?" asks Patricia Gallagher, executive director of the National Capital Planning Commission, which has published a set of guidelines for physical security measures based on a 2002 security plan for the District of Columbia.

With the approval of the General Services Administration, the decision was to keep the disputed street closed, with the promise that it would reopen if the security environment were to improve. This compromise was similar to the strategy used on Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House, a pedestrian area that can be converted for use by vehicles such as a planned transit circulator.

The idea is to avoid irreversible measures. But a building with a big setback will have a permanent impact on the feel of the area.

"We care about the design of the [perimeter] elements, but the problem is bigger than that," says Gallagher. She sees similar conflicts in other revitalizing parts of the city, such as the area north of Massachusetts Avenue called NoMa, home to the new headquarters of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, a new Metro station, and extensive private development. "We're looking at the larger environment, and how this is changing the nature of the places," Gallagher says. "If you start incorporating the most security-laden designs into new emerging places, you're not going to get something that's like the rest of Washington, D.C."

Security central

Security measures are evident at infill sites throughout the capital, where redevelopment projects are under way from Capitol Hill to Foggy Bottom. Public or private, virtually everything is considered a potential target-like the cluster of buildings housing the International Monetary Fund and World Bank-or perceived as vulnerable by virtue of being next to a potential target, like the Newseum, a glass-walled building designed by Polshek Partnership Architects for the site next door to the Canadian Embassy on Pennsylvania Avenue at 6th Street.

Even before September 11, federal agencies tended to reach for off-the-shelf, worst-case-scenario security prescriptions, like a minimum 50-foot building setback, says Christine Saum, director of Urban Design and Plan Review for NCPC. And the adoption of tough security requirements by agencies will affect not only new development but also existing real estate.

In October 2003, the Department of Defense issued guidelines that included an 82-foot setback for leased or owned facilities, with a 147-foot setback preferred in some cases. The guidelines apply to buildings housing Department of Defense employees, which translates to millions of square feet in the capital area alone. Within 10 years, all DOD personnel remaining in buildings without the prescribed setbacks have to move out, Saum says.

"That could empty out large parts of Arlington," she says. "There are huge ramifications." Arlington County has commissioned Stephen Fuller of George Mason University to study the anticipated economic impacts on the area.

Guides and strategies

Security standards vary depending on the government agency or professional organization issuing them. Rather than a single standard covering all aspects of security in the built environment, a patchwork collection of guidelines has emerged, sharing many of the same themes-starting with a suggested process for threat assessment and risk analysis-to determine if security measures are worth doing in the first place.

Security strategies, recommendations, and standards that have emerged since 2001 include some that are essentially voluntary, such as the National Capital Planning Commission's, although the commission does have the authority to approve or disapprove specific projects. Mandatory standards are those of the Interagency Security Committee, which apply to all new federal buildings and major modernization projects controlled by the GSA and the DOD-for new construction, new and renewed leases, and rehabilitation projects. The agencies' authority extends over buildings they either own or lease.

Security documents include these:

* The National Capital Planning Commission is currently drafting proposed new policies to guide the design and placement of federal perimeter security elements to complement its 2002 Urban Design and Security Plan. The commission's central recommendation-perimeter protection strategies using hardened street furniture and landscaping-is an attempt to marry security and good urban design. NCPC has coordinated efforts with the National Park Service to protect monuments and landmarks in the nation's capital.

* The Interagency Security Committee produced minimum standard requirements that apply to some 9,000 owned, occupied, new, or renovated federal facilities nationwide that are overseen by the Federal Protective Service under the Department of Homeland Security, chiefly under the jurisdiction of the General Services Administration. For security reasons, the guidelines are not published, but they include a process for evaluating threats based on the mission and location of the facility; minimum setback requirements for all new public buildings based on risk levels (with 50 feet as the standard "standoff" distance-the space between an explosion and the front of a building); and requirements that existing buildings with insufficient standoff be hardened.

There are also strict limits on underground parking; number of entrances; public circulation areas and loading docks; a guide to blast-resistant building materials; design criteria for electrical, mechanical and structural engineering; and extensive requirements for perimeter barriers.

The guidelines, called the "Security Design Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects," were issued in May 2001-before the terrorist attacks that year. Like most security planning, they were prompted by the Oklahoma City and overseas embassy bombings of the 1990s. In 2002, the General Accounting Office issued a critique of security in federal buildings, which is available on its website.

* The Department of Defense has its own rules for new and existing buildings (State Department guidelines are separate as well, but they are used mostly for embassies abroad). "Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings," issued in 2003, includes 23 standards in four major categories: site planning, architecture, structural elements, and electrical and mechanical. Some parts of the document are for official use only, but minimum standoff distances are known to be the primary strategy.

The guidelines cover everything from air intake vents (which must be at least 10 feet above the ground) to proper glazing for shatterproof windows; underground parking is prohibited. These guidelines apply to facilities occupied by DOD employees and to existing facilities, which must be either retrofitted or vacated.

DOD's criteria are mandatory for new construction and must be applied to building renovations when costs exceed 50 percent of the replacement cost of the building. They will also apply to any new leases beginning in 2006 and to renewed leases beginning in 2010.

* The Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, published by the Federal Emergency Management Administration in 2003, is a richly illustrated guide for public and private property managers and builders that provides pointers on threat assessment, perimeter security, building materials, and emergency response.

Draft guidelines published by the American Planning Association, available on the APA website, call for sensitivity to the urban context, an embrace of the "eyes on the street" concept in crime prevention through environmental design, and linkages with safe growth, where strategies are integrated in order to protect against a wide range of disasters. These guidelines warn that overly prescriptive security solutions can hurt downtowns and promote dispersal and sprawl.

"There are many proven planning and design measures to control the physical environment and to reduce crime, such as design controls, natural surveillance, natural access control, territoriality, security lighting, and others," the APA draft guidelines note. "These planning measures can address vulnerability and risk in a more effective manner than have many of the post-9/11 ad hoc measures which heighten fear and compromise unduly the unique character of a place and of a community."

* The National Fire Protection Association's recommended guidelines, NFPA 1600, Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Program, were endorsed for use by the private sector by the Department of Homeland Security. The American National Standards Institute also made recommendations aimed at helping organizations prepare, mitigate, respond to, and recover from disasters, including terrorist attacks.

* New York City's revised building code, introduced in 2004, includes guidelines for tall, high-occupancy structures that call for structural design that resists progressive collapse, a prohibition on open web bar trusses, impact-resistant materials in stairways and elevator shafts, and wider and more numerous stairwells. The standards, developed by a special task force, mostly apply to new construction; existing buildings get several years to comply.

Chicago also has made some changes in its building code, but the National Council of Building Code Officials is using the New York code as a national model-a framework for other big city building departments to use in making changes to their codes. Without a doubt, building and fire safety codes across the country will be scrutinized after the National Institute for Science and Technology makes its expected report on building performance this spring.

"There is a lot of information out there. The question is, who's using it, and how to get it out there in a way that's relevant," says New York-based architect Barbara Nadel, editor of Building Security: Handbook for Architectural Planning and Design (McGraw-Hill, 2004), which has been popular with state and local governments as well as private property managers and developers.

Nadel says most of the security activity is occurring in New York and Washington, the targets of September 11, but that both government and private owners across the country will start implementing more security measures in the years ahead, primarily because of liability concerns. If a disaster occurs, building owners who are sued need to show they took precautions. "You can't say you didn't know," says Nadel.

Financial firms in Manhattan alone have spent an estimated $4 billion on security, primarily for contingency systems but also for some physical measures, such as the strengthening of the base of the Citigroup headquarters in Midtown.

In Boston's Back Bay, the base of I.M. Pei's John Hancock building is now ringed with a necklace of shiny silver bollards spaced three feet apart, with bright lights shining out of grilles at the top. There is no parking anywhere on the block and the top-floor observatory has been permanently closed.

Keeping everyone out

Security experts say there is a kind of ripple effect as private owners or local governments turn to the institutions that have already taken security steps. Federal courthouses set the tone. They are ringed by bollards and low walls, and street activity and parking often are closed off near the building.

Complexes of state and federal government buildings, such as those in San Francisco and Chicago, have also blocked off their front plazas to create activity-free zones. In Albany, New York, Jersey barriers, metal fences, guard shacks, and a crash barrier with a sign saying "No Pedestrian Traffic Allowed" line the edges of the state capitol's Empire State Plaza. In San Diego, a heavily secured federal courthouse is on the drawing boards.

At secured courthouses and major government buildings, the circulation of people is carefully controlled, there is no underground or on-street parking, and standoff zones often create a barren environment. The message is clear: These are not places to hang out.

"Civic buildings and spaces shaped in the interest of security just become bunkers," says David Dixon, a principal at Goody Clancy, a Boston-based architecture and planning firm. Dixon has been sounding the alarm about the effect of security measures on cities since September 11. Security isolates people from buildings and shuts buildings off from streets, he says, but the vibrancy of cities depends on a lively interplay between buildings and the public realm.

According to Dixon, the basic problem of security hasn't gone away. Planners and architects concerned about the impacts of security post-September 11 wanted to influence the creation of standards, he says, and they were successful to some degree-as the previously noted list of guidelines seems to indicate. Most are taking steps to make sure perimeter security looks better than lines of Jersey barriers, but even with guidelines and standards that call for tasteful perimeter security, Dixon says, but there will still be battles over maintaining sensitivity to the larger urban context. The battles "just become more subtle and long-term," he says.

Government standards are prompting the most concern, he says, because for many cities with older downtowns, new public buildings are in the vanguard of redevelopment.

Some think there is an ulterior motive for the quick adoption of security measures, in both the public and private sectors. "Corporations and government agencies have used [security needs] as an excuse to button up and keep people out," says Laurie Olin, principal in the Philadelphia-based Olin Partnership, which was hired by the National Park Service to protect important landmarks, including the Washington Monument. "It plays into the hands of those who want to minimize public contact and ease of access."

"People aren't scared, but government centers are less friendly for the people they are meant to serve," Olin adds. "Federal buildings and courthouses have become locked-down, armed camps. And these buildings have a real influence on the surroundings. The standards arc pretty much the same as for embassies abroad-the 100-foot standoffs, cameras, security personnel, screening."

Think before you spend

The economics of security may play a bigger role in the years ahead. Some experts say that corporate CEOs want all the best measures, but then balk when they see what it will cost. When that happens, it sometimes means less drastic measures, but it can also mean a basic approach that is insensitive to the immediate surroundings. And while some security consultants want to sell products, others urge caution about spending money to protect buildings when money might be better spent on intelligence, terrorist interdiction, immigration, and airline screening.

That is a point made in recent government reports, including those by the 9/11 Commission and the U.S. Inspector General, which audited spending on port security. Those reports suggest that the federal government has a haphazard pattern of funding security through the Department of Homeland security.

Overall funding for the states dropped from $3.3 billion in 2005 to $3.1 billion in the Bush administration's proposed 2006 budget, but the formula for grant distribution will be adjusted to reflect the greater needs of cities and larger, more populous states. For urban area funding, the administration has proposed spending $1 billion-the same amount as in 2005.

Security for buildings clearly remains a priority, for both public and private properties. The replacement of Jersey barriers with more attractive, hardened street furniture was only the first step. More serious protections lie ahead: extreme setbacks, bans on underground parking, street closures and limited entrances, and the abandonment of buildings that don't meet such standards. At a minimum, they could imply a very different kind of urbanism.

Resources

Online. National Capital Planning Commission: www.ncpc.gov. The General Accounting Office critique of federal guidelines: www.gao.gov/new.items/d021004.pdf. The Federal Emergency Management Administration's Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings: www.fema.gov. APA website: www.planning. org. National Fire Protection Association: www.nfpa.org. American National Standards Institute: www.ansi.org.

Grants. Homeland Defense Journal magazine offers a free 20-page handbook to state and local governments seeking grants for security efforts. Go to www.homelanddefense journal.com; a link to the handbook appears at the top of the page.