Abstract

The focus of this dissertation is the impact of Vietnam on America's senior military with respect to their most important task--advising the nation's leadership on the use of American military forces in potential combat situations.

That Vietnam should have had such an impact was to be expected. Considerable anecdotal evidence—some recounted in this dissertation—indicates that lessons and analogies taken from past events frequently influence foreign policy-makers. Indeed, historical analogies are particularly compelling during crises, when the tendency to supplement incomplete information with past experiences is especially marked.

Not surprisingly, therefore, lessons drawn from American involvement in Vietnam have greatly influenced military thinking on the use of force. These lessons have had a chastening effect. Contrary to the stereotype of the military as hawks eager to employ military forces abroad, the post-Vietnam military generally have been quite circumspect in their approach to the use of force. Military caution has been evident in a number of the post-Vietnam cases—each of which is examined in this dissertation—where presidents considered the use of force. In fact, in no case since Vietnam has the military leadership proffered more aggressive recommendations than those of the most hawkish civilian advisers.

Caution, it is explained here, is likely to characterize the military approach to the use of force for some time. The legacy of Vietnam is unlikely to soon recede as an important influence on America's senior military. The frustrations of Vietnam are too deeply etched in the minds of those who now lead the services and the combatant commands.

Caution has its virtues, of course. As will be noted, however, the lessons from which that caution springs are not without flaws. In addition to the considerable wisdom that resides in them, the lessons the military took from Vietnam contain a number of ambiguities and problems as well. Indeed, those who seek guidance from any past event should beware the pitfalls that await them, for history can mislead and obfuscate as well as guide and illuminate. As this dissertation will conclude, so has it been with Vietnam.