Abstract

La question de Hume, au regard de l'identite, n'est pas de savoir en quoi consiste l'identite ou s'il y a une identite, mais comment il est possible de l'affirmer. Elle concerne en fait, la question du fondement de l'identite. Il s'agit de prouver comment, a partir de la definition d'un soi envisage comme faisceau de perceptions, les perceptions du soi peuvent etre unifiees entre elles.

Les conclusions auxquelles Hume parvient, dans le Livre I du Traite de la nature humaine, sont l'admission d'un echec: sa theorie de la connaissance ne permet pas de fournir ce principe unificateur des perceptions.

Dans la presente recherche, nous examinons l'hypothese a partir de laquelle la doctrine des relations de Hume, plus precisement celle de contiguite temporelle, jette une lumiere nouvelle sur la question de l'identite et represente une voie possible pour en elucider l'enigme.

Alternate abstract:

Hume's question, with regard to identity, is not to know what identity consists of or whether there is an identity, but how it is possible to affirm it. In fact, it concerns the question of the foundation of identity. It is a question of proving how, from the definition of a self considered as a bundle of perceptions, the perceptions of the self can be unified among themselves.

The conclusions that Hume reaches, in Book I of the Treatise on Human Nature, are the admission of a failure: his theory of knowledge does not make it possible to provide this unifying principle of perceptions.

In the present research, we examine the hypothesis from which Hume's doctrine of relations, more precisely that of temporal contiguity, sheds new light on the question of identity and represents a possible way to elucidate the enigma.