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Haddad explores the dimensions of identity of Christians in the Arab culture, and assesses their main loyalties as well as their tenacity in maintaining their religious identity in an overwhelmingly Moslem society. Research was carried out in two Christian communities in Jordan, one of which lives as a minority in a large Muslim town while the other lives in a predominantly Christian village where no Moslems live.

Introduction

A sensitive topic in the studies as well as the politics of the Middle East is the place of Christians in societies where the great majority of the people are Muslims. Jordan is one such society. This subject has three dimensions: the Arab culture and the cultural identity of Christians in a Moslem society; the state and the rights of Christian minority; and finally, religious affiliation and its variety among Christians in the Jordanian society and its relevance for the first two. Yet, except for their widely known identity as a religious minority,1 as are most Christian communities in the Middle East, the other two dimensions have not been studied seriously. This research is therefore an attempt at exploring the dimensions of identity of Christians in the Arab culture, and assessing their main loyalties as well as their tenacity in maintaining their religious identity in an overwhelmingly Moslem society. What symbols do they use and what differences do they demonstrate from their Muslim neighbors? How does the state perceive them and what positions they may occupy? Finally, do all Christian communities in Jordan show the same features or are these communities different when they live as a majority in their villages? In order to explore these questions the writer carried out research in two Christian communities in Jordan, one of which lives as a minority in a large Muslim town while the other lives in a predominantly Christian village where no Moslems live. The results show that Christians maintain both their Arab and Christian identity equally strongly in both communities, and that they are treated as citizens with some reservations in relation to occupying some prominent roles in the state.

Definition of Arab/Christian Identity

How do Arab Christians define their identity? Is it only the religion or are there other distinctive features to distinguish them from Muslims in the Jordanian Arab culture? The Arab culture in Jordan, unlike some regional cultures in the Middle East, embraces the two monotheistic religions, Islam and Christianity, equally comfortably. There are other religious denominations as well but these go unnoticed, such as Baha'is and Ahmadiyya, for example. Most of the adherents of these latter faiths do not engage in public activities or missionary work, nor have they established any centers for their religious practices.

The term `Jordanian Arab culture' refers here to the national `collective representation'2 the people in Jordan use in their identification of themselves to the world outside. Yet there is a distinction between the general Jordanian identity and other more specific ones. The former appears to be a complex construct of specific identities related to what is common among their religious beliefs, rural, urban or nomadic residence and political philosophy.

Theoretically, group identity involves the following: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, historical memories, one or more common reference points such as custom and language, an association with a specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity within a significant sector of the population.3 However, a problem is raised by the question of the components of identity as a collective possession.4 The literature reveals two dimensions; one having internal constituents and a second consisting of external components. Most of the literature stresses the internal components distinguished into human and material dimensions.5 Some scholars went so far as to say that identity and its components have the recognition of others as outsiders or as having a counter collective representation.6 Others have spoken of identity as being identical to culture.7 Yet, others see identity as expressed through lifestyle, both the historical and the contemporary expressions being represented in consumer goods and consumption behavior. Cohen8 speaks of it as the `people's cultural meaning system' (what is work? marriage? worship?). It is important to recognize that identity, as a phenomenon, is one extra dimension of the in-group and out-group classifications, where both representations and stereotypes find their origin.9

However, a problem arises when the concept of identity is related to ethnic affiliation as seen in the works of several authors.10 Even in the situation of the state, national identity as combined with ethnicity cannot lead to a kind of general statement of validity. Ethnicity can no more count for national affiliation as assumed by some authors.11 Hannoyer and Shami seem to be mistaken when they speak of national identity as manifested in the allegiance to original locality as an expression of identity.12 Many Christian Arabs stressing their Palestinian identity as a regional and patriotic one refer to a territorial identity, called Arab identity. They refer to their regional belongingness as expression of their complaints about being discriminated against in the state in which they are given a state identity. It is now certain that Palestinians (Christians as well as Muslims) in the USA complain of this situation and manifest their Palestinian patriotic identity despite their status as American citizens, or their academic or professional positions or despite their association with the capitalist class. Similar reactions are encountered among Dutch, French or Belgian Jews, despite the fact that the constitutions in these countries gave them equal rights as citizens. Houses, property, territory and other material elements appear to contribute to an identity at the micro level.13

If the national identity in the West as a creation of the state has led to the amelioration of the respective ethnic, religious and regional or local identities, the state in the Middle East has not succeeded at doing so. Here, the state and other identities are differentiated by a gap which is the result of a different process which led to the state formation in the Middle East. The states in the Middle East were imposed upon the people, and they had to institutionalize themselves among the people while unable to give equal rights and endorse equal obligations. They downplayed other identities within the states in their attempts to maintain and preserve the new national identity. In some cases they sustained these other identities because of the functions they performed for the consolidation of the state either directly or indirectly. Where the historical aspect came to play an important role on the level of the various identity forms, the role of the state was contradictory.

Religion and Identity

All these considerations lead us to perceive the various aspects of identity formation either as independent or combined with the religious aspect. Thus, situations are different as there are groups of people who share with others the national, the patriotic, the local,14 the ethnic and the lifestyle but differ in religion. The latter aspect often makes a significant difference. Religion appears to be a strong basis for identity enhanced by several types of pressures to become the major reflection of identity, such as in the case of the Christians in Jordan.15 In all societies religion is a source of information about the natural and the social, providing explanatory devices for various questions. For social groups, to distinguish themselves from others, religion comes to play a prominent role in maintaining identity, especially in cases where ideology (whether political or otherwise) coincides with the main religion, as is the case in the Arab countries.

Common denominators with religious majority groups, then, pave the way for religion to play a decisive role in identity formation and manifestation of minority communities. Not only do the groups as such distinguish themselves through their religions, but display distinctive features of identity in addition to other components: houses, symbols, names, clothes, anthems, linguistic expressions, extent of freedom, rites, rituals, etc. The religious ideology tends (sometimes or often) to contain the historical dimension, the organizational aspect and a wide range of phenomena. It derives from the realm of belief, and is attained through communication and socialization. It is based on values, symbols, legends, traditions, and is often defined in terms of customs and rituals. Yet the ethnic element does not escape being sometimes contained within the religious or the territorial. Religion functions often to endow the various aspects of man' s life with sanctity.

Hannoyer and Shami state that Palestinians, through the lack of allegiance to the state, fall back on their allegiance and affiliation to their place of birth or villages in the home country or to the land (region or country) to manifest their identity.16 This raises the question as related to the situation for Arab Christians who are singled out as a religious group. In the present paper I will concentrate on the relationship between the concept of identity and the mentioned variables as related to Christians in Jordan, particularly in the two communities Shatana and El-Husn.

The Village of Shatana

Shatana has a religiously homogeneous population with a Christian majority. It is situated at about 6 km to the southwest of El-Husn, a town with a religiously heterogeneous population. Shatana used to have a village council until 1997, when the Ministry of Interior integrated it into the Municipality of El-Husn as a policy of administrative cost reduction.

The people of Shatana are divided into adherents of three churches: Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic. In fact most of the people of the village live outside it and return only to administer their land: they either rent it to others or work it by themselves. Every group left some of their relatives behind in the village. In 1995 there were 365 people living in the village, most of them elderly or very young people with their mothers.17 The fathers worked in the town or abroad. Emigrees from Shatana went either to Australia, Canada, the United States, or to the big cities in Jordan. As all the people of Shatana are adherents of Christianity, the general sense of religious affiliation within the village is obviously intensified. The active interreligious interaction the people of Shatana had was with the people in the other surrounding villages, whose inhabitants were Muslims. Another interchurch distinction is felt between the Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox, particularly when it comes to intermarriage between the members of the different religious denominations.

Traditionally, most houses in the village used to be similar: one or two room houses of which one is a bedroom and the other is both a sitting and guestroom. The kitchen and the washing place are in the sleeping room and sometimes in a separate space. Another space separate from these two rooms and a rather larger one is for the animals: cows, oxen, sheep, goats, a donkey and sometimes a horse and chickens. Only a few of the older houses have a separate bathroom, mostly outside the living area. This house structure used to be common to all the villages in North Jordan. Some variations could be observed in the houses of typically well-to-do people which were built of well cut and rectangular rock stone, having all amenities inside the house. Such houses had a better distribution of space. At the front doors of the houses there are paintings of the cross/crucifix referring to this identity. On the tables in the sitting or guestrooms there is usually a bible (the New Testament) and pictures of Christ and/or the Virgin Mary, or a painting of the Last Supper with the 12 disciples. These icons show clearly who is Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox or Greek Catholic.

Modern houses in Shatana differ widely; they are provided with all accommodation within the house. In relation to religious identity only a few have religious marks. The few writings found on the front walls do not show that such houses are for Christians or for Muslims. Seen from outside, the village appears clearly as a Christian village with its crosses above the church towers and the complete absence of Mosques. However, except for some cross signs on the front doors and the very few things mentioned before, nothing material refers to that identity, neither the structure of the houses nor the distribution of the space inside the house or the house yards.

Identity also appears on the fashion and clothing style of the female population of the village. Most of the women and girls wear a necklace bearing a gold cross or icon of the Virgin Mary which denotes their religious identity. However, traditional clothes do not differ from those of the Muslim women in any other village. Modern clothes differ somewhat. In contrast to Muslim communities, the veil or the hjab is absent in the village.

However, the social structure is not different. The sense of tribal identity is the same as that among Muslims in other villages. Only the names are different. The names referring to Muslim Arab names as Mohammad and its derivatives are absent. Yet all the names are very authentic Arabic names and all of them can be traced back to the Arabic root as in all the Semitic languages. Sometimes one finds European personal names. Despite the Western influence of the priests at the three churches in the village, the people maintain their Arab culture and are proud of their ethnic origin.

Ethnically, most of the people in the village claim to be the descendants of the Ghassanides. The latter formed a Yemenite tribe who left Yemen and came to the Syrian desert in the fifth century AD. They formed a kingdom that functioned as a buffer state for the Byzantine Empire, protecting its borders against the nomads' raids from the Arabian desert. However, this legend could not be verified through the genealogical trees the researcher made for the clans in the village. The highest total of generations the researcher was able to trace back is 10 and the lowest was eight. This is an average of nine generations. This means that none of the clans of Shatana can trace its ascent back to more than 250 years. Yet this legend gives strength to their Christian identity, for the Ghassanides were a Christian tribe that left Yemen at that time, presumably when the ruler of Yemen `Dhul Nawwas' had decided to Judaize the population. With this they claim the religious identity of Arabs before Islam and this gives them the pride that they remained faithful to their religion despite all the pressures on them to become Muslims. The continuity of their settlement in Shatana reveals clearly how proud they are to have been able to maintain themselves as a group in the region through the period of Ottoman domination when the region was in a lawless state and governed by the authority of the nomadic tribes.

This pride extends to the way in which the Shatana clans were able to protect the territory they claimed for themselves despite the fact that they were surrounded by villages with exclusively Muslim populations. The territory they preserved to themselves is four times as large as that of the neighboring village of Kitm at the eastern borders. Yet, as did most of the Christians in the Jordanian rural areas, most of the inhabitants of Shatana left the village and migrated to different places, leaving their landholdings uncultivated. Thousands of dunums (a dunum is 1000 m^sup 2^) are left untitled except for the very few tracts of land on which their owners cultivated olive and wine trees.

The spoken language in Shatana is identical to that spoken in the neighboring villages. In their daily speech, certain expressions are missing and other expressions are used as adapted to their religious education. In conversational Arabic people swear oaths frequently. Muslims swear oaths such as `wihyat en Naby' (`I swear by the life of the prophet'). Christians swear oaths like `wihyat el Massih' (`by the life of the Messiah or Christ') or `wihyat erRab' (`by the life of the L,ord'), or `wihyat Yasu' (`by the life of Jesus').

As a sign of allegiance to a given church, males insist on marrying in the church to which they belong, and the bride and her family are expected to abide by this rule. The result is that exchange of wives takes place across the churches' adherents. In this sense other rules than the religious ones apply. Endogamy, either village, tribal, clan is common and forms the rule in the village. Marriage between a Christian male and a Muslim female is rather excluded, whereas marriage between a Christian female and a Muslim male may occur but only rarely. If such interfaith marriages do occur the people speak of `bride theft'.18

Even though Christian marriage rituals differ enormously from those of Muslims in various respects, but they are also similar in some of the procedures. The similarity stems from the shared tribal culture of the two groups. The differences have both traditional and religious origins. In the parties celebrating the Christian wedding, for example, there is no segregation between the sexes; dances and song performances are engaged in by both men and women in mixed gathering. The church ceremony of the wedding is also mixed. The celebrations take place outside the church and are attended by men and women together. Godfathers and godmothers are designated important roles not only at marriages but also at baptism.

Among the churches, however, there are some differences as to the rules of kinship relations between the spouses. The Greek Orthodox Church still refuses to marry close or cross cousins. They have to be separated by at least four generations. This had been perhaps a main stimulating factor for the Roman Catholic and the Greek Catholic Churches to proselytize among the adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church.19 Baptism of children is a requisite for Christian identity in Jordan, for in marriage or in cases of death and inheritance a person needs to prove it to the church court. In its absence one may be subject to the personal laws of another church. Circumcision is absent among Christians in Jordan except for individual cases

The Town of El-Husn

El-Husn is a town with some 25,000 inhabitants. It is situated at about 8 km from the city of Irbid. The center of the district is called `Irbid Governorate.' Christians in this town form about 30% of the total population. Despite the emigration process, Christians in the town increased. The reason is that after 1950 a Christian exodus began to take place from the rural areas to the urban centers. Also, those who had not been able to afford the high prices in the city of Irbid chose to go to El-Husn, the only town where Christians in North Jordan form a network of intermarriage relations. At first their numbers used to be very small and the choice for a bride was very limited. But soon El-Husn, in this way, became the only town in which the out-migration was compensated for by in-migration.

In contrast to Shatana, El-Husn attracted some Protestant churches including the Anglicans, the Baptists and the Seventh Day Adventists. At a given time a group of Jehova's Witnesses came to the town but they had little chance for success. These churches remained with a very limited number of adherents. Yet though church membership is cross-tribal, some tribes place their claims on certain churches. The Greek Catholic Church was established by a certain tribe and still forms the bulk of that church. So also the Anglican Church, whose membership is limited to one clan.

In terms of religious identity, the situation in El-Husn was rather the same as that of Shatana. The only difference is that in El-Husn Muslims and Christians used to live beside each other in a given coexistence.20 Tolerance has been the rule as based on tribal organization and social structure. These foundations continued after the formation of the state and each group has been able to maintain their own religious identity.

The religious identity question in El-Husn was sharper as a result of the opposition. In several cases, Christians forgot the internal conflicts, be they tribal or church membership, and united to meet given situations and challenges. Despite the fact that most of the Christian tribes in EI-Husn allied themselves to a Muslim tribe, in crisis situations, they would forget all alliances and rush to help their Christian brothers. Prior to the 1950s, Christians in El-Husn were looked upon by their Muslim neighbors as more educated and economically better off. The majority of the Muslim populations perceived the Christians as more developed and modern. Nowadays the case has changed.

Christian dress in El-Husn is clearly different from that of Muslims, especially women's dress. Whereas Muslim women wear either head scarves or sometimes the veil, Christian women usually wear Western style clothes, go out wearing shorts and their heads bare. It is clear that the religious background of these people plays a big role in the norms dominating the social behavior. It is also clear that the religious values form a basis on which to accept or refuse some of the modern trends such as dress style, make up fashion or popular music, dance and other forms of socializing. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that both groups influence one another's behaviors, linguistically as well as materially. El-Husn, for example, was the first town where Muslim women adopted Western style dress.

In El-Husn marriage rituals and rites are almost the same as in Shatana, but marriage celebrations show a number of differences. The wedding parties in El-Husn, for example, no longer take place at home with the traditional slaughter of sheep and the cooking of the traditional dish, the mansaf, this being a common custom between Muslims and Christians. In Shatana all these celebrations take place at the house of the groom's father. The difference with the Muslim marriages is that in the Christian wedding celebrations, `haflat urs,' alcohol is consumed. In El-Husn Christians have an alcohol purchase allowance which is not allowed for Muslims in a state decision.

Until recently, El-Husn was the only town besides Irbid to have liquor shops. Nowadays Irbid, a city of one quarter of a million inhabitants, has five liquor stores, whereas El-Husn with its 25,000 inhabitants also has five stores. Despite the fact that alcoholics may be found among the Muslim population, alcohol drinking and selling is considered a Christian activity in the country and a part of the Christian identity. In itself this is a problem. Alcohol and its trade are principally forbidden in a Muslim society. Those who deal with alcohol are regarded as `fallen,' immoral, and deviant. In Islam, consumption of alcohol is totally prohibited. Even trade in it is forbidden and buying it is considered a cursed action.21 Yet because consumption of alcohol is permitted in Christianity and the state allowed it to Christians, religious Muslims do not interfere, though they look upon the people consuming it or dealing in it as inferior and outcast.

An inseparable part of the Christian identity in El-Husn in the past was landholdings. Though the number of Christians dropped to form one third of the population, the original Christian community maintained their land ownership which is equal to two third of the total agricultural area in El-Husn. This used to be their proportion to the Muslims in the total town population. Even the land was referred to as the `land of the Christians.22 The same holds true for the artificial wells in the town.

Schools in El-Husn used to be exclusively Christian and most of the people who went to school until 1930 went to Christian schools.23 Until the 1960s El-Husn used to have four elementary schools and two preparatory ones, after which the students used to go to secondary schools in bigger urban centers such as Irbid and Amman. Since the 1960s state provided education became the dominant system and there was a decline in Christian education that remained at the level of elementary education.

Christians and State Identity

Except for Armenians, Christians in Jordan consider themselves as Arabs and are proud to have maintained their ethnic identity, both their Arab identity and their religious identity. Until the establishment of the modern state in Jordan they were included in the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire. Before that they were subjects in the successive Muslim states that considered them as dhimmis. The new state-first the Government of the Arab East, later the Emirate of Trans-Jordan, and in 1946 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan-considered Christians as citizens according to the first versions of the Constitution that assigned to them a quota in the Parliament. Before law Jordanian citizens of all faiths enjoy full equality irrespective of their ethnic or religious affiliations.

Education of Christian Children

With the development of education in the new state, religious education became one major component of the curricula. Islamic texts were integrated into the curricula and religious education became part of the teaching program at school.24 During the classes of religious education which were exclusively Islamic, Christian students were free to stay or leave the classroom. Most of them used to leave the classroom. As compensation, the educational system allowed Christian students to follow their religious education on Sunday morning for two hours and to come to school at 10 o'clock instead of 8 o'clock. Similarly in Christian private schools Christian religious education was given but not Muslim religious education.25

In the last decade this system changed as many people started to send their children to private schools where education is better. Yet for the comprehensive exams these students had to take examination in religious education. The Ministry of Education made teaching religion compulsory in private schools. To conform to this policy they permitted a priest or reverend to give religious education at public schools.

Yet to speak of equality among citizens in Jordan seems a delicate question. There are certain posts in Jordan that Christians cannot and can never occupy. The Constitution dictates that Islam is the religion of the state. Accordingly, there are a number of posts that only Muslims can occupy.

Personal and Civil Code

Matters of personal affairs such as marriage, divorce, adoption, alimentation, inheritance, etc. are concerns of the religious courts for both Muslims and Christians. In these matters also equality is not there and the individual is still subject to the religious law, whether he is religious or non-religious. The choice of the Jordanian citizen is to be either Moslem or Christian. The Muslim (male and female) may ask for divorce and be divorced. Christians do not have that opportunity in the church courts except for the Greek Orthodox Church that allows it under certain circumstances or after seven years of separation from table and bed between man and wife.26

In cases of `bride theft,' the government does not interfere and the matter is left to the local governor (muhafez). This position holder sends for the girl (usually a Christian girl marrying a Muslim) asking her if the matter is of her own choice. If the choice is hers, he assembles the family of the girl or the clan and obliges them to sign a guarantee not to harm her in any way. To the outsiders it appears as if the state protects Muslims against Christians. Yet we have no cases of Christians marrying a Muslim woman to check what the repercussion would be and what the behavior of the government in this case would be. Thus it is implicitly and explicitly clear that for state as well as for social reasons a Christian man will not marry a Muslim woman.27

Interfaith marriages can create community conflict. When a Muslim takes a Christian wife, she goes to the shaikh (the Muslim religious judge) and proclaims her conversion to Islam. For the parents or the clan of the girl, the problem becomes twofold. One is social and the second is religious. Any action her Christian family may take against such converted girl is considered as an assault against Islam and Muslims and may result in community conflict. As a numerical minority group, Christians, in such cases, prefer to repress their emotions and anger and contain the problem. This issue forms a case for the law to solve.

Outside these personal issues, Christians in Jordan are considered as citizens and participate in all fields of activities, socially, politically and economically. They are represented in public offices in a higher percentage than their proportion to the total population. The economic situation of Christians in the country seems to be better off than that of Moslems and the proportion of poor Christians as compared to that of Muslims is far lower.28 Their children attend public schools without any distinction or discrimination.

Conclusions

Christian Arabs in Jordan enjoy and maintain their religious identity freely and openly. They distinguish themselves by means of various prominent features that their Muslim co-citizens do not share. The few differences and problems they have can be related to the concept of citizenship, as this applies for both Muslims and Christians, which the state still has to solve. The concepts of state and citizen have to do with the essential organization of the state that is still unable to conceive of the citizen as an individual for several reasons. One of these is that the state cannot afford to take care of individuals socially and economically, as do the Western states. It still relies heavily upon the family to bear the burden of taking care of the children until they have jobs and become independent. The basic social unit for the state is still the family and not the individual. It is perhaps here that the state has most difficulty in modernizing the essential laws to bring the individual to the axis of social and political life. As religion is a mechanism of keeping the family as a unit and enhances cooperation, and the state is unable to undergo such changes as to make the individual economically and politically independent, it will maintain the present status quo. But this will always have its repercussions on the sociopolitical development of the state. Such correlations among the various aspects of the life of the individual and the modernization of the state are still to be investigated.