Abstract

Nearly one quarter of the world's countries are run by dictators. Yet, in comparison to democratic systems, we know very little about how dictatorships work, who the key political actors are, and where the locus of power rests. Indeed, we often assume that political outcomes in dictatorships reflect the whims of a single individual: the dictator. Yet, is this empirically accurate? Do all dictators rule with a free hand? My dissertation contributes to our understanding of this form of government. I develop an innovative theoretical argument which highlights the impact of organizations, such as strong parties and militaries, on the constraints that dictators face on their behavior. Checking the power of dictators essentially amounts to credibly threatening to overthrow them. Given that most dictators are ousted by members of their own inner circle, my argument emphasizes the role of the dictator's support group: the elite coalition. Using a combination of theoretical insights and empirical testing, I examine the conditions that cause authoritarian leaders to wage war, to enact significant policy changes, and to step down from power. I show that leaders in military dictatorships face the greatest checks on their power, followed by leaders in single-party dictatorships, and lastly leaders in personalist dictatorships. When elites are bound together by an established institution, like a military or party, the consequences are profound, decreasing dictators' bargaining power over policy relative to their supporters. The dissertation helps to explain multiple political outcomes, ranging from the ability of dictatorships to send signals of commitment during inter-state disputes to their capacity to attract foreign direct investment. Assuming that dictatorships are all one and the same conceals important differences in the organizational structure of these regimes, and consequently, in the ability of dictators' supporting coalitions to tie the hands of the dictator.