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The intellectual development of the workplace privacy construct in the course of American thinking is traced. The role of technological development in this process is examined, particularly in regard to the information gathering/dissemination dilemmas faced by employers and employees alike. Some preliminary considerations toward a theory of workplace privacy are presented.

ABSTRACT. This paper traces the intellectual development of the workplace privacy construct in the course of American thinking. The role of technological development in this process is examined, particularly in regard to the information gathering/ dissemination dilemmas faced by employers and employees alike. The paper concludes with some preliminary considerations toward a theory of workplace privacy.

George Orwell, in his classic negative utopian novel 1984, has described what many believe to be the ultimate in privacy-shattering totalitarianism; the land of Oceana. In this fictitious realm ". . . There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment . . . It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time . . . You had to live - did live, from habit that became instinct in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized" (Orwell, 1949, pp. 6-7). When written, Orwell's novel offered a foreboding look at future society. We have now advanced technologically to the point, where if desired, this kind of surveillance is easily possible. In many workplaces it is already a reality. The popular press and television "magazines" are replete with documentation of corporate excesses in this regard (see, for example, Kilborn, 1992; Egan, 1991; or Sullivan, 1991).

The former chair of the United States Privacy Protection Commission, David E. Linowes, has stated that "surveillance of workers on assembly lines, in offices, and in stores is now more intense than ever before" (Linowes, 1988, p. 6). In addition to issues such as technologically enabled worker surveillance, current practices such as drug and alcohol testing, computer-aided credit checking, AIDS testing, genetic screening, overall healthiness screening, on-and-off-duty conduct regulation (e.g. co-worker dating/marriage, company monitoring of worker behaviors such as political activities, gambling, lifestyle preferences ... ) are the subject of hotly contested debate.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the workplace privacy issue, the role technological advances have played in it, and its impact upon employees and employers alike. It is hoped that through this examination the workplace privacy issue will be placed in perspective and contextualized. The paper will conclude with some preliminary thoughts toward a theory of workplace privacy.

The development of the workplace privacy concept

If one views the American workplace historically, a clear observation that can be made is that management has exercised its hegemony over workers with great power and control (see Cochran, 1972). Early writers in the field of management reinforced this power-based relationship (see, for example, Taylor, 1911). In his now classic treatise on the functions of the executive, Chester Barnard stated that control of people is the essence of management: "Willingness (to cooperate) means self-abnegation, the surrender of control of personal conduct, the depersonalization of personal action" (1938, p. 84). Conformity and compliance became key concepts in the management of human resources during this time, as is amply documented in The Organization Man (Whyte, 1956). As the social turmoil of the 1960's and 1970's erupted across the business landscape, and as women joined the ranks of management in unprecedented numbers, the power relationship of organization to worker, and the demand for conformity and compliance remained as strong as ever (see, for example, Kanter, 1977). The 1990's however, appear to have brought a change in the acceptance of the conformity and compliance norms. There appears to be a new drive towards individualism, which may be intensifying concerns over workplace privacy (see Leinberger and Tucker, 1991).

Employers and employees alike have expressed sufficient concern over this issue that several congressional hearings have been held on issues related to privacy (see, for example, Privacy and 1984). Furthermore, there has been a burgeoning literature for practitioners offering legal guidance in the area of workplace privacy (see, for example, Commerce Clearing House, 1989; Shepard et al., 1989; Adler et al., 1985; and Wells et al., 1989). Although some broad summaries of the issues and literature of workplace privacy exist (for an academic treatment see Stone and Stone, 1990; for a practitioner-oriented piece, see Hoerr et al., 1988), a truly definitive examination of workplace policies and practices does. not exist (a first step in this direction is Masters and Brown, 1994).

How have these strong individual privacy needs developed in American culture? Let us begin with an examination of the intellectual and cultural development of the concept of workplace privacy

Intellectual development of workplace privacy rights

The genesis of workplace privacy rights can be traced through the recesses of time to the legitimization of the rule of law, the natural rights of humans, and the origins of democratic thought (see Fig. 1). Ancient writings such as Plato's Republic (c. 360 B.C.), Aristotle's Politics (c. 340 B.C.), Cicero's De Legibus (c. 50 B.C.) and DeOfficius (c. 50 B.C.), Tacitus' Annals of Imperial Rome (c. 50 A.D.) and Justinian's Institutes (c. 530 A.D.), the codification of Byzantine law, provided a rich heritage for the western tradition that criticized tyrannical use of power and endorsed justice and fairness in the natural interactions of humanity.

The influence of the works of these ancient scholars on Enlightenment philosophers has been well documented (see Anchor, 1967; or Berlin, 1956). Locke's Second Treatise on Government (1690), Rousseau's The Social Contract (1762), and Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws (1748), argued for the natural rights of man and established life, liberty and property as inalienable rights of all humankind.

Historical researchers have been able to trace the direct influence of these philosophers on the thinking of the founding fathers of the United States of America (see, for example, Banning, 1978; or Clough, 1981). Adams, Jefferson, and Madison through revolutionary, and later governmental writings, and through the Federalist Papers dialogue, refined the Enlightenment thinkers' positions to establish the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness within the egalitarian context of democratic society. This conceptualization of natural rights was shaped through the passage of time by Jacksonian democracy and the Transcendentalist school of writers forming a unique perspective on individualism and individual rights in America.

This process of intellectual refinement continued, and in 1890 the first major conceptualization of privacy as a right was published (see Warren and Brandeis). Judges Warren and Brandeis articulated a general right to privacy as a "right to be let alone" (p. 193). While they stated that no constitutional right to privacy was explicit, they argued that a right to privacy is implicit in a number of places in the Bill of Rights, and is, therefore, a derivative right. This position has been debated and advanced in the applied ethics literature (see, for instance, Thompson, 1975; Rachel, 1975; or Reiman, 1976).

As the right to privacy thinking matured, it expanded towards the workplace. Arguments for rights in the workplace ranged from debate over whether a right to employment existed (Nickel, 1978), to conceptualizations of workplace justice (Ewing, 1977, 1989), to a bill of workplace rights (Werhane, 1985), to a right to meaningful work which does not alienate or dehumanize the worker (Schwartz, 1982). These arguments evolved into considerations of organizational uses and dissemination of information (Linowes, 1988), conduct regulation (Leap, 1988; Masters et al., 1988) and the broader considerations of privacy in the workplace (Stone and Stone, 1990; Masters and Brown, 1994).

Technology and workplace privacy

Technology and technological management of employees is pervasive in today's workplace. A rich and active debate has been ongoing for some time as to the costs/benefits of some forms of technological management of employees. The extent to which management can now monitor worker behaviors (both on-and-off-site) has dramatically increased over the last ten years. Much of the popular literature has focused on the cases in which management had gone beyond acceptable standards of information gathering. An industry critic of the Alaskan pipeline company, Alyeska, was the subject of a program of surveillance by the company which included "bugging" his phone, reading his mail, and parking a van outside his home with high-tech listening equipment enabling recording of conversations within the critic's home (Sullivan, 1991). Similar, yet not quite so flagrant, cases abound involving large companies such as Proctor and Gamble (Egan, 1991) and Trans World Airlines (Kilborn, 1992), among others.

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Putting aside cases of excess as just that, excessive use of power, a more fundamental question exists. Does current technology allow management to "see" more of workers' lives than they need? Has management now achieved the technological power to expose workers innermost selves to scrutiny? Zuboff (1988) and Burris (1993) call this panoptic power, a high-tech, informated update of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon solution for institutionalized control offered in the late eighteenth century. Foucault (1979, pp. 200-202) has described the effect of Bentham's panopticon as ". . . to induce on the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action . . . the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so . . ."

Panoptic power in the technologically mediated workplace Does the technologically mediated workplace provide management with panoptic power over its employees? Several examples may help to clarify the answer to this question.

In a recent survey of the Fortune 200, 72% of the respondents indicated that among the types of pre-employment data collected on workers, a post-offer pre-employment physical examination was required (Masters and Brown, 1994, p. 137). A new technology which is seeing growing use in this regard is genetic screening of potential employees (Hurd, 1990). Through this new technology employers can screen the genetic composition of a potential worker for risk markers which indicate a biological predisposition for a number of infirmities (Olian, 1984).

Candidates for employment may then be denied a job offer not because they have a specific illness (which would be problematic under the Americans with Disabilities Act) but because they may someday contract the illness. Thus in the interests of health care cost saving, an individual is denied employment on the grounds of an immutable genetic potentiality, which may never come to fruition, and may not even be known by the applicant.

Once through the genetic screening process a new worker may be issued a "smart" identification badge implanted with a micro-chip that allows management to track workers through their workday (Sloane, 1992). The smart ID badge relays information about the employee to a central computer which can provide reports on the wearer's name, present location; length of time spent in various locations, and which other badge-wearers were with the individual and for how long.

It has been long-standing practice in many industries that telephone and electronic mail communications be monitored by management, but a much more comprehensive workplace monitoring system may be used. Zuboff (1988) documents two work production monitoring systems in knowledge-work organizations that provided management with continuous job performance data on each employee. Originally intended for improved documentation of work processes, with a view towards productivity improvement, management rapidly discovered a secondary use of the data: continuous human performance data. Worker performance was subjected to a new level of scrutiny as they become technologically "visible" at all times.

The panoptic power of management has extended beyond the workplace and into the home. Many companies now regulate off-duty conduct such as cigarette smoking, diet (through cholesterol screening and weight-control programs) as well as hobbies deemed dangerous such as motorcycle riding (Sipress, 1991). Some companies will regulate off-site conduct by banning marriage among currently employed managers (Masters and Brown, 1994). In instances of off-duty violation of the law, public policy, or corporate policy, many organizations will terminate employment (Leap, 1988).

Panoptic power as technique in the informated workplace

Jacques Ellul, in his classic work The Technological Society (1964), defined technique as ". . the totality of methods rationally aimed at arrived at and having absolute efficiency . . . in every field of human activity" (p. XXV). He sees technique as that which integrates technology into society in an invidious way: "When technique enters every area of life, it ceases to be external to man; it becomes his very substance" (p. 6). Technical progress, he argues, dehumanizes with its impersonal obsession with efficiency removing person considerations from the equation: ". . . Technical activity automatically eliminates every nontechnical activity or transforms it into a technical activity" (pp. 82-83). This impact is to the extent it alters the very essence of humanity: "The milieu in which he lives is no longer his" (325). Ellul sees a society of human subjection to the all-powerful technique: "The human being must be completely subjected to omnipotent technique, and all his thoughts and acts must be the object of. . . techniques' (p. 410). Zuboff (1988) chronicles experiences very similar to what Ellul describes in the two informated organizations she examines: "Information technology essentially alters the contours of reality work becomes more abstract, intelligence may be programmed, organizational memory and visibility are increased by an order to magnitude beyond any historical capability . . . The dream contains the image of people serving a smart machine, but in the shadow of the dream human beings have lost the experience of critical judgment" (p. 390).

Another aspect of technique is its seductive power - if a technology exists, it must be used. Fromm (1968) describes a value structure in a technological society wherein a technological "can" implies an "ought." All other values are suppressed an "technological development becomes the foundation of ethics" (p. 34). Zuboff (1988) again offers confirmation from her fieldwork: "In these organizations, the promise of automating seemed to exert a magnetic force, a seduction that promised to fulfill a dream of total control" (p. 390).

James Beniger (1986) argues that the advent of technology in the Industrial Revolution was the catalyst for a revolution in social control. As the means of control became increasingly bureaucratized (in the Weberian sense), the power wielded by those in control became consolidated. The question this raises is that if bureaucracy equals control as Beniger states, then does informated bureaucracy equal domination? Simon Ramo (1983) believes that technological domination of individuals has reached the point where he calls for a new governmental agency to deal specifically with the impact of computers on society. As might be expected, Herbert Simon (1977) takes issue with this line of thought, arguing that computers and computer files have never previously been the criteria for suppression of human freedom. For instance Simon argues, computers per se, do not invade an individual's privacy. What facilitate this invasion of privacy are the crude methods of protection from abuse, however, the real culprit in the suppression of individual freedom is human nature itself.

Panoptic power as marxist exemplification

If we grant, for the moment, that Simon is correct, that human nature and not technology is at fault in the suppression of human freedom (particularly in the workplace), may we not then ask does not human nature and an informated workplace make domination over individuals even more potent? Does not this technology convey even more power to dominate over those whose freedoms are being suppressed? Christopher Lasch (1987) argues that management values technology so highly because it consolidates its control over labor. Winner (1980) emphatically states that technological artifacts can have political qualities, particularly in regard to institutionalized patterns of power and authority.

Marxist interpretations of the employment relationship and the organization of work emphasize several key points (Pfeffer, 1982, p. 163).

* employers seek a powerless workforce

* employers seek a workforce easily con

trolled,

* means of production (technologies) selected have the effect of deskilling workers to ensure social control over them, and * the employment relationship is structured so that management power is largely hidden and control over workers is achieved.

Thus technology is used as a means of social control in the Marxist paradigm, and the bureaucratization of the organization and its technologies assures control over the workers. Although many studies of worker traits could be cited here, Edwards (1976) typifies the behaviors described above. He found that through the manipulation of evaluation and rewards systems by management three types of bureaucratically-induced behaviors were reinforced and controlled: rules compliance, habits of predictability, and internalization of organizations' goals and values.

Howard (1985, pp. 30-31) describes a computerized performance measurement system at Citicorp which provides a daily printout on each clerk showing such things as time spent on the telephone versus processing financial services, time spent on each piece of work versus a standard time for the job as established by a Citicorp industrial engineer. An overall productivity rating (as determined by the system) is affixed to each clerk's daily performance. These types of panoptic technological performance measurement systems create an electronic social text hitherto previously nonexistent. Advocates of it offer it as a total feedback system for coaching productivity improvement. It is, however, a method of total control which makes the individual totally "visible" for the entire workday: ". . . the informating capacity of the new technologies can heighten the transparency of workers' behavior as both the substance of work and the way it is performed become part of the new electronic text" (Zuboff, 1988, p. 314). Furthermore, from a Marxist perspective, this type of system creates a class of techno-crats administering the system who effectively disenfranchise the masses of workers through their total control (Burris, 1993). Through the use of this knowledge in a power relationship managers attempt to maintain the status-quo regarding authority and hierarchical power.

Privacy and personhood

What are the implications of the panoptic power of management for the individual in the informated workplace? If workers are more "visible" or "transparent" than ever before in the informated work relationship, what fundamental questions should be considered regarding the application of these technologies to the individual?

A psychological perspective

Erich Fromm (1968, p. 41) calls the induced human passivity of industrial society "pathological." This passivity is just one symptom of what he calls the "syndrome of alienation" characteristic of modern industrial society. Other symptoms include feelings of powerlessness, loneliness, and free-floating anxiety. Fromm further connects these feelings of aloneness, powerlessness and isolation to submission to a perceived total control by some authoritarian figure or institution (1969).

Howard (1985) links psychological illnesses such as anxiety, depression and nervous breakdown to the stress induced by continuous computer monitoring of workplace performance (p. 71). Zuboff (1988) found similar feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness due to the new visibility of the informated workplace (p. 344), and attributes worker reaction to the desire to control feelings of shame at being so exposed to management scrutiny. One way to cope with the dilemma of total visibility and fear of shame is through anticipatory conformity which ". . . accepts the visibility and adapts to it by producing behavior that minimizes the risk of unwanted discovery" (p. 345). Burnham (1983), in discussing the enhancement of control and authority that computerization brings, explains individuals' reactions to this type of submission as a compression of the worker's ego coupled with a recognized loss of autonomy. This leads to what Brod (1984, p. 130) calls technostress induced by total computerized performance monitoring: ". . . now they can calculate such minute statistics as how many pieces of paper a typist might use to type a letter, or how long it took an employee to read two reports and six memos.

There are other social psychological explications to reduced workplace privacy as well. Albert Bandura (1977, 1982) links feelings of self-efficacy and mastery to performance, motivation, goal-setting, and reactions to feedback. Low self-efficacy feelings lead to low motivation, poor performance, low degree of difficulty goal-setting and poor reactions to supervisory feedback. Ultimately this can lead to feelings of learned helplessness and efficacy-based futility Zuboff (1988) reports on loss of mastery by workers through the introduction of technology into the workplace that would control, limit and weaken the workforce. Interestingly, though, these systems are a two-edged sword as they deprive managers of customary supervisory interaction patterns: "Like the operators they are supposed to direct, many . . . managers felt robbed of the familiar ways in which they have experienced mastery, with little to embrace as a substitute" (Zuboff, 1988, p. 348). Where, then, does this leave the individual worker regarding privacy needs in this highly visible informated workplace?

A philosophical perspective

A recurring theme in the debate over privacy rights is the relationship of privacy to human dignity. As early as Warren and Brandeis' seminal paper (1890), concern over the publication and dissemination of information thought to be private has been expressed. Warren and Brandeis argue that the advances of modernity and technology create a right to privacy where one may not have existed as strongly in simpler times. They feel that the violation of privacy is an incursion on something hitherto inviolate, something primal and rooted deep within the person, part of their "inviolate personality." Bloustein (1964) takes up this argument and advances it, clarifying "inviolate personality" as including concepts such as human dignity, individual uniqueness, integrity of self, and individual autonomy. Bloustein asserts that subjecting oneself to complete public scrutiny destroys autonomy, uniqueness and sense of self - it is the complete violation of the "inviolate personality" referred to by Warren and Brandeis. Stanley Benn (1978) examines privacy protection and attempts to determine inherent reasons for the right to privacy. Authenticity in social exchange is a key area for Benn. If an individual knows he is under scrutiny, it affects his fundamental nature as a social being, as a modified self is presented. One can take this a step further and ask if one must "mask" one's true self to avoid scrutiny and judgement of our inner selves, does this lead to enhanced guilt and shame over the act of image management, and does this exacerbate negative feelings toward self? Benn argues that respecting persons as human beings is tantamount to respecting their privacy. This is particularly true, Benn asserts, when dealing with issues of surreptitious monitoring and incursions into matters of bodily privacy. Reiman (1976) concurs in this, stating that one's sense of self and definable personhood are integrally related to privacy. As revelations regarding intimate aspects of a persons life are revealed, Reiman asserts, one's personhood is diminished.

Ottensmayer and Heroux (1991, p. 523) have stated that "Computer surveillance and related forms of testing and controlling workers raises serious ethical dilemmas for thoughtful managers." In fact Wilson (1975) has called employee privacy a "moral obligation" of employers (p. 49). Velasquez (1992, p. 399) points to three key variables in managing the ethics of workplace privacy:

(1) relevance- an employer should constrain areas of inquiry into the employee's lives to those clearly and distinctly related to employment issues.

(2) consent- and employee should be given the right to withhold consent prior to any query that might violate privacy.

(3) methods- an employer should distinguish between methods of inquiry that are reasonable and customary and those which are of questionable ethical grounding.

If care is not taken in the ethics of the informated workplace, technology will divide and remove the individual from her authentic self, and thereby destroy our existential sense of being. How then does one manage this process?

Towards a theoretical construct of workplace privacy

It has been argued that the right to privacy is fundamental to the maintenance of human dignity and is the boundary to one's personhood. The violation of this boundary destroys one's individually and is the last defense against the examination of the intimate details of self by the external world (for a series of essays on those subjects, see Schoeman, 1984, passim). It has been equally argued that business has a responsibility to society in general and its shareholders in particular, to maximize its profits in any way possible (Friedman, 1982, 1970).

A major threat to corporations' continued financial well being has been the spate of successful negligent hiring litigations brought against employers. Failure to adequately screen prospective employees and/or verify claimed competencies, can result in costly court decisions citing corporations for negligent hiring (Odewahn and Webb, 1989). Thus, given the legal exposure if employers do not adequately check into vital information regarding potential and current employees' backgrounds, this creates a seemingly legitimate need to know. However, if companies are overzealous in their information collection practices, and/or collect or release inappropriate/ incorrect information, legal liability is again incurred (Wells et al., 1989; Ryan and Lasek, 1991). Thus, the employer is caught in an information gathering/disclosure dilemma. To what extent must the right to privacy be counterbalanced by the need to know?

Where a business necessity for information and an individual's personhood intersect, the domain of workplace privacy is created (see Fig. 2). The adequacy of the organization's response to individual privacy needs can be judged in the "correct" balance between rights, policies and practices (see Fig. 3).

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This correctness is a moving target in both time and space. Thus, what is normatively correct today may be greatly different than what was a correct balance ten or fifteen years ago (or even five or less years ago). To maintain a correct balance, organizations must constantly scan and assess the privacy landscape. The most apparent and immediate measure of adequate balance of privacy and information needs is worker outcomes.

Thus as can be seen if an organization has been able to establish a correct balance, positive (or at least non-negative) outcomes will accrue for both the individual and the organization. An incorrect balance can result in negative repercussions such as elevated conflict and inefficiencies, possible perceptions of personal violation and, at the extreme, potential litigation.

By assessing policy and practice intent versus actual outcome, one can judge the need to modify one's position on the privacy - violation matrix (Fig. 4) in order to manage what can become a difficult situation.

Clearly, if the assessment process is an appropriate and accurate one, the organization should place in one of the "positive" cells on the matrix. However, if the organization has a high information need, and incorrectly "reads" employee privacy needs as low to moderate instead of moderate to high, workplace tension, perceived privacy violation and workplace conflict may result. But is simple monitoring sufficient for the stated purpose?

Privacy as an existential concept

Charles Lindblom (1952) argued that managers, rather than being thoughtful, detailed planners, often "muddled-through" policy formulating decisions. James Brian Quinn (1982, 1978) refined this concept through research to determine that managers guided important activities, including policy formulations, incrementally. These incrementally-made decisions were integrated with broader strategies through a number of coordinating activities. These decisions are made in response to the perceived context as experienced by the decision-makers, filtered through the knowledge of past experience, and extant rules and regulations. Policy decisionmaking is thus an emergent, ever-evolving process. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to describe the workplace privacy policy formulation process in these broadest of terms.

It has been argued in this paper that privacy, as represented by both corporate policy and practice, and worker perceptions of policy and practice, is a dynamic concept in both time and space. As such, it is constantly emerging reality - a constant interplay between how society has traditionally defined privacy, and the current emerging "state of the art." Berger and Luckmann (1966) have argued that reality is a socially defined, constantly emerging process. This process is made of the objectified knowledge as previously constructed and defined by society as well as the subjective, existential reality as experienced by the individual. The confluence of these two components produce the individual's Weltanschauung or worldview. Rollo May (1961) has described this existential moment as ". . . centering on the existing person; it is the emphasis on the human being as he is emerging, becoming" (p. 16), and that "there is no such thing as truth or reality for a living human being except as he participates in it, is conscious of it, has some relationship to it" (p. 17). Workplace privacy considerations are just such a personally immersive issue.

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The confluence of emergent, incremental policy formulation with the subjective reality of the existential moment for the individual crystallizes privacy in the workplace as an existential concept. If one examines the development of privacy rights thinking throughout intellectual history (Fig. 1), the dynamic interaction of business necessity and individuality (Fig. 2), which determines the nature of the privacy experience (Figs. 3 and 4), one is faced with the emergent existential reality of the workplace privacy construct.

Therefore, if we are to meaningfully construct workplace privacy policy, we must not just look at the outcomes of enacting the policies and practices objectified by past social or corporate culture. We must also assess the workers' attitudes regarding these policies and procedures to try to ascertain the nature of their subjective perception of the workplace experience. This will give us some insight into which direction change is likely to go. Thus, a constant and vigilant scanning of worker attitudes, which manifest themselves in the outcomes described in Fig. 3, is essential to maintaining a policy or practice which is in congruence with the emerging reality and is in synchronization with the existential moment. In this manner an organization may improve its chances to diminish workplace tension, and privacy violations (as defined by the emerging social perception) and increase chances of policy/practice acceptance and workplace harmony. Additionally, by assessing policy and practice, workplace outcomes and worker attitudes, we as scholars can continue to chronicle the emerging reality of workplace privacy.

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[Author Affiliation]

William S. Brown is assistant professor of Management at Babson College, Babson Park, Massachusetts. Prior to entering academia he had over 17 years human resource management experience in the corporate headquarters of Fortune-ranked firms such as the Prudential Insurance Company of America and Philip Morris, Inc. as well as in non-profits as Barnard College, Columbia University and the Pittsburgh Board of Education. He has published in various professional journals and practitioner magazines.

[Author Affiliation]

Babson College,

Babson Park, MA 02157,

US.A.