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Institutional incentives, ethnic myths, and interethnic conflict in counterbalanced states
by Shoup, Brian D., Ph.D., Indiana University, 2007, 291 pages; AAT 3278229

Abstract (Summary)

Interethnic competition assumes a distinctive character in plural societies characterized by ethnic counterbalance. Counterbalance describes cases where one organized ethnic community demands priority in the political system while another ethnic community controls a significant portion of a country's economic assets. In such cases, tensions emerge as politically dominant groups fear the loss of political hegemony to a more economically aggressive group. At the same time, economically successful groups require the provision of key public goods and a political atmosphere conducive to economic investment. Citing evidence of the existence of interethnic bargains predicated upon myths of indigenousness that stipulate the respective social roles of different ethnic communities, the project argues that the incentives created by institutions, especially electoral systems and redistributive programs, can persuade or dissuade individuals in competing groups to work to sustain peaceful relations between segments of society. The dissertation develops a model that explains how and why interethnic bargains between groups can erode given different institutional configurations. It is hypothesized that interethnic conflict is more likely in countries where political institutions fail to insulate the political hegemony of traditionally dominant ethnic communities and redistributive programs fail to improve the economic position of ethnic majorities. In such cases, outbidding strategies by more extreme ethnic leaders are more successful and violence becomes more likely. Three cases are examined to test the model: Fiji, Malaysia and South Africa. These cases are selected because of key demographic similarities, similar patterns of colonial intervention and their divergence according to the dependent variable. Fiji represents a case where conflict has been persistent since the mid 1980s. Malaysia has generally been regarded as a successful case of a plural society. South Africa is a case where new institutional arrangements are presently being tested to see if they can minimize interethnic conflict and minority exploitation.

Indexing (document details)

Advisor:McGinnis, Michael D.
Committee members:Monroe, Burt,  Hale, Henry,  Ganguly, Sumit
School:Indiana University
Department:Political Science
School Location:United States -- Indiana
Keyword(s):Ethnic conflict, Electoral systems, redistribution, Institutional incentives, Counterbalanced states, Fiji, Malaysia, South Africa
Source:DAI-A 68/09, Mar 2008
Source type:Dissertation
Subjects:Political science, Minority & ethnic groups, Sociology
Publication Number: AAT 3278229
ISBN:9780549224488
Document URL:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?did=1404353461&sid=11&Fmt=2& clientId=12007&RQT=309&VName=PQD
ProQuest document ID:1404353461


 

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