This dissertation closely examines Anglo-American diplomatic relations during the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1961-1962 Generally, these two Cold War conflicts are recognized as two separate incidents in two disparate regions, Europe and the Caribbean. This study treats them as a set of "twin crises" in a continuum, and scrutinizes close, multi-level consultations and cooperation that American and British policymakers maintained throughout the twin crises. Such close contacts across the Atlantic were kept not only at the highest level, namely between the heads of government, but also at the level of foreign ministers as well as among officials of the State Department and the Foreign Office. Through this intergovernmental circuit, British policymakers often succeeded in having a significant influence on American decision-making in a subtle but effective way. London took advantage of bilateral contacts---both formal and informal, and official and private---to grasp policymaking trends within the American government, and thereby decided upon the best approach when dealing with Washington. This study also argues that Washington and London closely collaborated, sometimes agreeing upon a division of labor between them; in order to maintain allied solidarity and to pursue negotiations with Moscow.
This dissertation also explores what conditions enabled the British to exert influence on the Americans by examining the Anglo-American partnership in a wider international context: alliance politics and development in the third world. This study reveals that while facing disagreements between West Germany and France, on the one hand, and smaller NATO countries, on the other, the Americans needed British diplomatic support and assistance in order to keep the alliance together. Such needs on the American side provided the British with room for diplomatic maneuvering. This examination also demonstrates that neutralist movements in Asia and Africa set the context in which the British could influence the Americans.