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We propose a model that integrates the extralegal consequences from conviction and impulsivity into the traditional deterrence framework. The model was tested with 252 college studnets, who completed a survey concerning drinking and driving.

We propose a model that integrates the extralegal consequences from conviction and impulsivity into the traditional deterrence framework. The model was tested with 252 college students, who completed a survey concerning drinking and driving. Key findings include the following: (1) Although variation in sanction certainty and severity predicted offending, variation in celerity did not; (2) the extralegal consequences from conviction appear to be at least as great a deterrent as the legal consequences; (3) the influence of sanction severity diminished with an individual's "present-orientation"; and (4) the certainty of punishment was far more robust a deterrent to offending than was the severity of punishment.

Deterrence studies focusing on the certainty and severity of sanctions have been a staple of criminological research for more than 30 years. Two prominent findings from this literature are that punishment certainty is far more consistently found to deter crime than is punishment severity, and the extralegal consequences of crime seem at least as great a deterrent as do the legal consequences (Nagin, 1998; Williams and Hawkins, 1986). Going back to Beccaria, punishment imminence ("celerity") has been accorded co-equal status with certainty and severity in theory, yet empirical tests of the celerity effect are scant.

This paper aims to advance this well-trodden intellectual and empirical ground by proposing and testing an integrated model of certainty, severity, and celerity. The framework of the model enables us (1) to investigate punishment celerity, not in isolation as the few previous studies of celerity have done, but as it relates to certainty and severity; (2) to distinguish the independent roles of legal and extralegal sanctions; (3) to incorporate aspects of individual difference theories into a rational choice approach; and (4) to explain the finding that punishment certainty is a more effective deterrent than is punishment severity.

Our model relies on two sources outside conventional explanations of deterrence. One is familiar to criminologists. In A General Theory of Crime, Gottfredson and Hirshi (1990) argue that persons who engage in crime can be distinguished by their "here and now" orientation. Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) similarly emphasize the impulsivity of criminals in their treatise, Crime and Human Nature. We formalize these complementary ideas with a foundational economic concept, "discounting." Economics uses "discounting" to compare consequences realized at different times. Nagin and Paternoster (1994) use this intuition to explain differences in investment in social bonds. Here, we make formal use of a discount factor to link the timing of punishment, the defining concept of celerity, and the amount of punishment, the defining concept for certainty and severity.

We also develop several novel techniques for measuring the aforementioned discount rate and placing a monetary value on the legal and extralegal consequences of criminal behavior. As elaborated below, we believe these advances in measurement have broader application in criminology.

INTEGRATIVE DETERRENCE

Contemporary deterrence theory, which descends virtually intact from the Enlightenment philosophers Beccaria and Bentham, continues to face mixed support for its three main predictions. Although punishment certainty has been consistently found to deter criminal behavior (Horney and Marshall, 1992; Parker and Grasmick, 1979; Paternoster et al., 1985), the evidence for severity (Decker et al., 1993; Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Piquero and Rengert, 1999) and celerity (Howe and Loftus, 1996; Legge and Park, 1994; Yu, 1994) effects is inconclusive. Further, as a purely situational account of criminal behavior, deterrence theory neglects the growing list of personal traits that appear to predict offending (cf., Block and Gerety, 1995; Evans et al., 1997; Fergusson et al., 2000; Longshore et al., 1996; Moffitt, 1993; Moffitt and Caspi, 2000; Moffitt et al., 1994; Nagin and Tremblay, 1999; Nagin et al., 1995; Seguin et al., 1999; Wallace and Newman, 1997). This paper proposes an integrative deterrence model that aims to more effectively reconcile extant findings and provide a more descriptively accurate account of criminal conduct.

In contrast to the considerable attention devoted to certainty and severity effects, few studies investigate punishment celerity. This oft-neglected deterrence prediction appears grounded in psychological investigations of "Pavlovian conditioning." In such studies, experimenters effectively suppressed animal behaviors with negative reinforcements occurring within six seconds following the targeted behavior. Criminology has adopted this finding as the basis for a celerity effect-that is, in similar fashion, delay should diminish the deterrent efficacy of a legal sanction. This analogy, however, neglects the fact that humans possess a far greater cognitive capacity than do animals for connecting acts with temporally remote consequences. Even more, the criminal justice system is designed specifically to remind defendants of the allegations against them at least several times during litigation. With respect to general deterrence, application of Pavlovian conditioning is even further strained. Although such conditioning results from prior punishment of the decision maker, general deterrence occurs when the decision maker contemplates the punishment experiences of others. General deterrence, then, does not concern a "connection" between behavior and consequences, but whether potential consequences already recognized by the decision maker seem sufficiently "costly" to deter behavior.

For these reasons, commentators have criticized the current theoretical basis for a celerity effect (cf., Gibbs, 1975; Howe and Brandau, 1988; Tittle, 1980). On this point, Gibbs (1975:130-131) has observed:

The only rationale for an emphasis on celerity is found in experimental psychology, notably research on "operant" behavior, classical (Pavlovian) conditioning, or aversive conditioning.... it is difficult to see how (such) experimental findings support the assumption that differences among jurisdictions or types of crime can be attributed even in part to contrasts in the celerity of punishment. In any case, one would surely be pressed to argue that the importance of the celerity effect extends beyond specific deterrence.

We share Gibbs's contention that classical conditioning provides an insufficient basis for a celerity effect. As to Gibbs's latter contention that the timing of punishment is therefore irrelevant to general deterrence, we wholeheartedly disagree.

An alternative basis for a celerity effect derives from straightforward economic reasoning about the "time value of money." Consider the future obligation to pay $1,000. There is a sensible basis to want to defer the obligation in order to use the funds and produce offsetting benefits in the interim. Imagine making an immediate payment that would relieve the obligation. The maximum acceptable payment, a plausible measure of the present aversiveness of the obligation, is likely to diminish as the payment date is further delayed. If evaluation of a future criminal sanction resembles that for a future financial obligation, the result is a celerity effect-the sooner the sanction is expected to commence, the greater its current costliness and resulting deterrent potential.

Ultimately, however, it is an empirical question whether this commonsense economic logic applies to criminal sanctioning. First, unlike a monetary obligation, there is no compelling reason to predict that individuals would be more likely to prefer to delay a sanction than they would be to want to "get it over with." Second, no natural reference exists to calibrate the strength of any preference for delay. In economics, the market interest rate provides an appropriate benchmark to "discount" a future financial obligation. To see this, imagine that funds are expected to earn 10% per year and we are again offered a choice to relieve a future $1,000 obligation with an immediate payment. If the funds were due in one year, the immediate acceptable payment should not exceed 1/1.1($1,000) = $910. If the obligation was due in three years, the immediate acceptable payment should not exceed (1/1.1)^sup 3^($1,000) = $750. No such objective standard exists by which to "discount" future criminal sanctions.

The concept of celerity, as we have currently redefined it, thus captures only one side of the role of timing in criminal decision making. A "celerity effect" is only possible for someone who would prefer to delay a sanction. Further, as the above financial example shows, the magnitude of any celerity effect depends on the strength of the preference for delay. For example, if the interest rate was 20%, the preference for delay is even greater. The immediate acceptable payment to relieve the $1,000 obligation one year hence would be 1/1.2($1,000) = $833. More generally, for any individual, the impact of celerity depends inextricably on whether and to what extent delay produces the devaluation of future consequences. This latter aspect of timing invokes the well-known criminological concept of "impulsivity" or "present-orientation."

Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) associate impulsivity with an inability to plan for the future. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) define impulsivity as the disproportionate adoption of a "here and now" orientation, in contrast to those who more often "defer gratification." In their subsequent "selfcontrol scale," Grasmick et al. (1993) measure impulsivity by asking subjects to report their level of agreement with statements like "I often do what brings me pleasure here and now, even at the cost of some distant goal," and "I'm more concerned with what happens to me in the short run than in the long run" (Grasmick et al., 1993:14-15).

As with celerity, at its core, impulsivity relates to the effect of timing on the perceived magnitude of consequences. In particular, impulsivity describes the degree to which an individual eschews the future for the present, which, in economic terms, is reflected in the discount rate. Recall the individual contemplating an immediate payment to relieve a $1,000 obligation due in one year. A market interest rate of 10% provides a credible basis to predict that the maximum acceptable amount should not exceed 1/1.1($1,000) = $910. If, however, the individual enjoyed gambling on professional sports, the gambling impulse could cause the maximum acceptable payment to be far less than $910. In this context, the gambler's impulsivity is evidenced by a high discount rate for the future $1,000 obligation. If, for example, the maximum acceptable payment was only $100, the implied discount rate, denoted by r, is markedly higher than is the market interest rate. It can be inferred to equal 900% by solving for the value of r such that (1/1 + r)($1,000) = $100.

We have thus far refrained the concepts of impulsivity and celerity and advocated their inclusion in the traditional deterrence framework. In doing so, however, we have focused on the deterrent properties of legal sanctions, which, as a number of scholars have now convincingly shown, represent only one of myriad potential behavioral influences. Meier and Johnson (1977:295) recognize the complications that alternative sources of conformance pose for deterrence theory:

There is no basis for presuming that other (extralegal) influences are somehow "controlled" when the bivariate relationship between legal sanctions and crime is measured. The important question which is not addressed by such studies is: when is compliance the result of legal threats, and when is it the result of other factors? . . . The rate of nonviolation may actually reflect two sources of compliance: (1) compliance produced by influences other than a legal threat and (2) compliance produced by legal threats.

Grasmick and Bursik (1990) add specificity to the observations of Meier and Johnson (1977) by delineating two such "extralegal" sources of conformity. Embarrassment is the social analogue to the legal sanction. It refers to disapproval of the transgression by individuals to whom the offender has significant personal attachments, such as spouses, friends, family, and colleagues. In contrast, shame follows a criminal act when the offender suffers personal dissonance from having violated an internalized behavioral norm.

Ensuing studies investigating extralegal sanctions have shown that a belief that illicit conduct is wrong (cf., Burkett and Ward, 1993; Foglia, 1997; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996) and the fear of peer disapproval, embarrassment, or social stigma (cf., Andenas, 1974; Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Nagin and Paternoster, 1994; Tittle, 1980; Williams and Hawkins, 1992; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973) discourage offending behavior. Further, several studies investigating the relative strength of both sanction forms find the conforming influence of extralegal sanctions to be far greater than that from legal sanctions (Bachman et al., 1992; Grasmick and Bursik, 1990).

The foregoing research suggests that in addition to accounting for the role played by the timing of sanctions, deterrence theory should permanently delineate alternative sanction forms to promote a more complete understanding of criminal decision making. Elaborating on the technical structure shared by most rational choice theories of crime, we outline a more expansive model of deterrence.

MODEL AND PREDICTIONS

MODEL

Like most theories, ours builds on the work of others. We expand the existing rational choice framework to include celerity and impulsivity, redefined in terms of the effect of delay on the evaluation of consequences. The model also adopts the longstanding distinction between legal and extralegal consequences of crime that was advanced by Andaneas (1974) and Zimring and Hawkins (1973) and explored empirically in more recent work (cf., Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Nagin and Paternoster, 1994; Tittle, 1980).

In the simple cost-benefit calculus at the heart of general deterrence theory, an individual will offend if

U(Benefits) > pU(Costs), (1)

where U(*) is a utility function that evaluates the benefits and costs of crime in a common metric, and p is the perceived risk of being sanctioned.1

We next generalize the model to distinguish between legal and extralegal sanctions as follows:

U(Benefits) > pU(Legal Costs + Extralegal Costs). (2)

Equation 2 reflects a simplifying assumption that extralegal sanction costs are triggered only by the imposition of a legal sanction. However, as Grasmick and Bursik (1990:841) recognize, "An actor can feel ashamed or be embarrassed even if the state does not detect the behavior." Williams and Hawkins (1986) also distinguish such "stigma from the act" from stigma that can originate from apprehension by authorities.

Absent some mechanism to account for nonlegal sources of conformance independent of the criminal justice system, Equation 2 can be taken to suggest that if there is no possibility of punishment, the crime must occur. On this point, Nagin and Paternoster (1994) add a term, U(Moral Regret), to the cost side of the ledger. This permits their model to account for individuals who, irrespective of instrumental concerns, will simply not offend. In their model, for such individuals, even if apprehension is impossible, U(Moral Regret) can exceed U(Benefits) and produce restraint.

Our model addresses this issue differently. Williams and Hawkins (1986) also observe that stigma from the act is likely to be least relative to stigma from arrest, for crimes that are simply mala prohibita, like marijuana use or drunk driving among college students. That said, even for relatively mala prohibita crimes, some influence by independently triggered extralegal constraints is likely. Our model accounts for such moral opposition through the utility function. As such opposition increases, U(Benefits) is reduced. For individuals whose independent restraint is of such magnitude that under no circumstances would they offend, we assume the crime is not therefore beneficial. In this case, U(Benefits) = 0 and, by the logic of Equation 2, the crime will not occur.2

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Equation 2 embodies the traditional certainty and severity predictions. An increase in either the certainty of punishment, p, or the severity of the legal sanction, Legal Costs, increases the right side of the inequality, thus reducing the likelihood of offending. This rudimentary expression highlights the tenuousness of a celerity effect under current theory; unlike the certainty and severity prediction, a celerity effect is not formally represented.

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[Reference]

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1986 Perceptual research on general deterrence: A critical overview. Law and Society Review 20:545-572.

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[Author Affiliation]

DANIEL S. NAGIN

Carnegie Mellon University

GREG POGARSKY

The University at Albany

[Author Affiliation]

Daniel S. Nagin is the Teresa and H. John Heinz III Professor of Public Policy at the H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University. His research interests include deterrence, the development of violent and criminal behavior, and statistical methodology.

Greg Pogarsky is Assistant Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at The University at Albany. He received his Ph.D. from the Heinz School of Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University in 1998. He also is an attorney and formerly practiced as a criminal public defender for the State of New Jersey. His articles have appeared in The Journal of Legal Studies and The Law and Society Review. His current research focuses on deterrence theory and offender decision making.