Copyright Appraisal Institute Apr 2001| [Headnote] |
| This article examines the agency relationships and potential problems in the hotel appraisal process in order to compare differences between appraised |
| hotel values and their market values for both institutional lenders and |
| the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). The mean percentage difference for hotel appraisals completed for the RTC is |
| much lower than those done for other institutional lenders during the late |
| 1980s and mid-1990s. Furthermore, the results indicate that appraisal |
| results may be a function of the relationships in the process and the motiva |
| tions of the principals involved. |
he purpose of this paper is to examine the agency relationships in the hotel appraisal process for both the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and institutional lenders (commercial banks, pension funds, insurance companies, and others). Agency relationships may have an effect on appraised values relative to market values (i.e., sales prices). If the agency relationships inherent in the RTC appraisal process are different from those involved in appraising for institutional lenders, then appraised values should be different as well.
Agency Relationships In the Hotel Appraisal Process
Appraisers have historically performed their work at the request of an outside party-typically a buyer, seller, or lender. Accordingly, buyers, lenders, and sellers can be considered principals in the appraisal process whereas appraisers can be considered agents. Other interested principals include appraisal organizations such as the Appraisal Institute or the National Association of Independent Fee Appraisers. These organizations maintain more of a monitoring role, but are interested in the work and conduct of appraisers all the same.
The different principals often exert influence on the process simultaneously. For example, during the 1980s it was very common for commercial appraisers to complete their work for buyers who would subsequently use the appraisal to obtain financing. Although the buyers may have had the strongest influence, others such as lenders had a significant influence as well. The structure of these relationships between the principals and the appraiser played a significant role in the process by affecting the outcomes.
Suspecting that buyers may have had too much direct influence on the appraisal process, the accuracy of commercial real estate appraisals became a topic of concern. The federal government issued a report in 1986 condemning the over-valuation of assets by both commercial and residential appraisers.' The overvaluation problem created a desire to scrutinize the appraisal process more closely and helped influence the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).
Government authorities believed that altering appraisal contracting procedures and requiring more detailed appraisals would help improve appraisal quality. FIRREA required lenders to become responsible for commissioning commercial appraisals and required the adoption of minimum appraisal standards. Additionally, the Appraisal Institute was formed in 1991 to provide a unified and central appraisal authority to help improve appraisal quality. Nevertheless, buyers and sellers were still involved in the process and maintained a vested interest in appraised values.
Another outcome of FIRREA was the creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in 1989. The RTC was given the task of selling non-performing assets and loans of banks that had failed. This required that they commission appraisals to help determine asset values. Although the RTC was supposed to recover the highest sales price possible for the properties, they were under pressure to sell them quickly because of the large number of properties and the limited funding available for their operations. As stated by Corgel and DeRoos (1994), many individuals believed that the RTC was under political pressure to sell properties at low prices as opposed to waiting for conditions to improve and obtain higher prices.' Finally, the RTC did not make commissions or development fees as institutional lenders typically did.
The agency relationships in the RTC appraisal process were quite different from those completed for institutional lenders. While institutional lender appraising included buyers, sellers, and lenders, the RTC appraisal process was different because the RTC commissioned the appraisal and was often both a seller and a lender. Additionally, a buyer was usually not known at the time of the appraisal because the appraisal was completed before a property was offered for sale. Overall, the differences in the relationships in the process and the minimal amount of future appraisal work from the RTC may have produced appraisal results that were different from those done for institutional lenders.
Agency Problems In the Process
One of the most significant agency problems in real estate appraising is information asymmetry. The lack of complete and timely information is a major problem for appraisers and is considered one of the distinguishing features of real estate markets. Despite this, appraisers are instructed by the Appraisal Institute to obtain information from knowledgeable sources in the market. This could include buyers, sellers, and lenders that are in this process and who could provide selective or biased information that could affect appraisal outcomes.
Another agency problem in the appraisal process is one of moral hazard. This problem is actually two-fold: one aspect affects lenders in the appraisal process and the other affects principals and their appraisal agents. Research by Cole and Eisenbeis provides evidence of institutional mechanisms in the 1980s (such as brokered deposits) that motivated thrift managers to engage in moral hazard and extract wealth from depositors.3 Statistics from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation indicate that commercial real estate loans for U.S. banks increased from 17.8% of total assets in 1980 to 27.1% in 1990.4 Increased risk-taking included making more commercial real estate loans and receiving favorable appraisals.
The second aspect of moral hazard is the mechanism in place to ensure that appraisers continue to satisfy the principals in the process. Accounting research shows that firms that receive an unfavorable audit report tend to switch auditors, reducing the likelihood of unfavorable audits.' This is borne out in the appraisal industry by such mechanisms as "approved appraiser lists" that are maintained by institutions that commission appraisals.6
The final agency problem in the appraisal process is one of ineffective monitoring. Research by Cole shows that thrift managers in the southwestern United States engaged in riskier investment behavior because they were aware that regulators were initially hesitant to close institutions because of the potential impact on the deposit insurance fund.7 Additionally, enforcement staffs were curtailed; federal and state examiner staffs declined from 7,165 in 1979 to 6,132 in 1984.8 Although FIRREA was subsequently enacted to increase the scrutiny of appraisal practice by professional appraisal organizations, there is some evidence that questions its effectiveness.
According to recent (year-end 1997) statistics provided by the Appraisal Institute (offering the most widely respected commercial appraisal designation), total membership at the end of 1997 was nearly 22,000; however, there were only two expulsions in 1992 and three in 1993. No members were removed thereafter. The timing of the expulsions may reflect the intense scrutiny placed on designated appraisers in the early 1990s. Moreover, the number of expulsions may either reflect an improvement in appraisal techniques and report quality, or a lack of consistent monitoring.
Previous Appraisal Accuracy Literature
The first appraisal accuracy study completed by Cole, Guilkey, and Miles found that sales prices varied from previous "outside" appraisals by 9.6%.'0 The study also revealed significant differences between property types. In a subsequent study using signed differences, the overall average difference between sales prices and appraised values was only 1.93%." Nevertheless, 82 of the 144 properties examined revealed appraised values exceeding sales prices. Although the overall average difference was small, differences can vary across property types and time periods. Therefore, these differences warrant further investigation into specific property types such as hotels.
Webb published a study in 1994 showing sign changes in the differences for different periods of time.2 For example, for the fourth quarter of 1987 through the fourth quarter of 1990, appraised values exceeded sales prices by 1.3% for industrial properties and 6.7% for office properties. On the other hand, sales prices exceeded appraised values from the first quarter of 1991 through the fourth quarter of 1992 for most property types. Unfortunately, his research did not include a sample of hotels. However, this research reveals that sign changes are related to specific time periods. Webb attributes the differences to information asymmetry for appraisers.
The sensitivity of the signed differences to time period reveals a need to scrutinize the underlying relationships in the appraisal process more closely along with the prevailing economic circumstances surrounding them. As discussed by Vandell, the underlying agency relationships involved in the appraisal process have an impact on appraisal accuracy and quality 13 Other research has examined the important influence of agency relationships on appraised values completed for institutional asset managers." Similarly, this paper is attempting to examine more closely the agency relationships and motivations of parties in the hotel appraisal process.
Economic Circumstances and Hypothesized Motivations
Given the established relationships within the appraisal process, economic circumstances influenced the motivations of the principals involved. The motivations of the parties involved change with economic conditions or federal legislation. Lenders, buyers, sellers, and the RTC are principals in the process that may want appraised values to be higher or lower than sales prices, depending on the circumstances. These changes in the motivations contributed to sign changes in the differences between appraised values and sales prices as shown in the appraisal accuracy literature previously discussed.
The aggressive commercial real estate lending environment of the 1980s was largely attributable to the Tax Act of 1981, strong economic conditions, and relatively ineffective monitoring. Hotel buyers wanted higher appraised values to qualify for loans. Moreover, buyers had a significant amount of influence as they commissioned appraisals directly. Lenders have always had a significant amount of influence as most hotels are financed (at least partially) with debt. Hotel lenders wanted higher appraised values to generate higher loan fees and more business. Hotel sellers wanted higher appraised values to help make sure that they received their negotiated price. The remaining principal, one of any number of appraisal organizations, could only offer negative incentives to an appraiser. Moreover, they did not have as much influence on the process as the other principals because of the lack of a unified organization and ineffective monitoring practices. On the other hand, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed depreciation schedules and adversely impacted real estate returns. Therefore, during the period immediately surrounding the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1985-1987), certain principals in the process may have wanted to sell properties more quickly. This is particularly true for lenders, who were concerned about the uncertainty of hotel values in this period. A lower appraised value would require a lower price or more equity from the borrower. Given the important influence of the lender, this would apply downward pressure on appraised hotel values.
After the passage of FIRREA in 1989 and the collapse of commercial real estate markets in the early 1990s, the motivations of principals in the appraisal process changed dramatically, particularly for lenders. Lenders were being closely scrutinized and appraisers felt pressure during this period to be very conservative and "make up" for the mistakes of the previous decade. Furthermore, Klassen argues that appraisers do not always over-appraise property; sometimes their values are too low." This was the case in the early 1990s, immediately after FIRREA.
In addition to the increased scrutiny of lenders and appraisers during this period, a declining economy adversely impacted the hotel industry. Hotel loans were harder to obtain during this period, particularly because of poor industry performance in 1991. Thus, in difficult economic times and a stringent regulatory environment, differences between appraised values and sales prices would be negative.
The recovery of the hotel industry in the mid1990s coincided with a re-establishment of the solvency of the federal deposit insurance fund. As occupancies improved and interest rates declined, buyers and lenders became interested in hotel investments again. Similar to late 1980s, lenders and buyers needed higher appraised values to finance and purchase properties. Given that this was after FIRREA and lenders were commissioning appraisals directly, lenders were influencing appraised values upward. This is supported by a 1997 survey of appraisers by Smolen and Hambleton that indicates approximately 80% of the appraisers were pressured by lenders to alter their values." Accordingly, this indicates that appraised values may be higher than sales prices as in the 1990s. A summary of the hypothesized appraised values relative to sales prices is shown in Table 1.
On the other hand, appraising for the RTC was much different than for institutional lenders. As previously discussed, the agency relationships were different in the RTC appraisal process. The RTC was a seller and an outside lender and was not involved in the process to influence values. Moreover, as the main principal in the process, the RTC needed to balance the need for obtaining a higher sales price against being able to sell a non-performing asset. The RTC was provided with a limited amount of time and funding to complete its task. Accordingly, lower appraised values would allow them to accept lower bids and sell the assets faster. Therefore, one would expect appraised hotel values to be significantly less than sales prices for RTC appraisals, regardless of the period.
Testable Hypotheses
Since the agency relationships are different when appraising for institutional lenders other than the RTC, the appraised hotel values will be different as well. The variable is the percentage difference between the appraised value of the hotel and its sales price. The calculation is as follows:
Percentage Difference = (Appraised Value
- Sales Price)/Sales Price As previously discussed, the economic conditions may have affected the motivations of the principals involved in the process. Given the preceding discussion, the four alternative hypotheses to be tested are:
* HI: The mean percentage difference for RTC hotel appraisals is less than 0.
* H2: The mean percentage difference for institutional lender hotel appraisals completed between 1985-1987 is less than 0.
* H3: The mean percentage difference for institutional lender hotel appraisals completed between 1988-1989 and 1993-1997 is greater than 0.
H H4: The mean percentage difference for institutional lender hotel appraisals completed between 1990-1992 is less than 0.
Data and Methodology
RTC hotel appraisal data was provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for properties sold between 1989 and 1993. Data for hotels with sales prices over $1 million were used to exclude any time share properties or condominium hotel units. A total sample of 122 RTC hotels was used in the analysis. Institutional appraisal data was provided by hotel owners, management companies, and appraisal firms for properties sold between 1985 through 1997. Although a sample of 107 "institutional lender" hotels was used in this analysis, some of the periods examined have very small samples. This must be taken into consideration when interpreting the results of this study.
One of the factors to be considered is the time difference between the date of appraisal and the date of negotiated price. However, since finding the date that the selling price was determined is extremely difficult, an alternative is to use the date of sale. In many circumstances, hotel sales are closed 6 to 12 months after the appraisal. In order to match the sales date with the date of appraisal, an index of sales prices was used that has been documented by Corgel and DeRoos. 17 The index makes use of a Fisher Ideal Price Index and a Hedonic Price Index. Key hotel characteristics such as average room rate, property age, franchise affiliation, and others are drawn from a large database of hotel transactions. A time series regression model is used to estimate the parameters associated with each characteristic. The index measures the changes in the product of the median value of each characteristic and its associated parameter.
The index is known as the Lodging Property Index and has been published on a quarterly basis since 1996. This index can then be used to help determine what the sales price should have been on the date of appraisal. Furthermore, the time period between the two dates can be used as a special variable (called a covariate) in an analysis of variance model. A covariate is used to reduce the error in the analysis of variance model and can help make the analysis more precise."
This study hypothesizes that a variety of factors may be affecting appraised values relative to sales prices. These factors include the time period in which the appraisal was completed, client type (RTC or institutional lender), and sales price adjustments. However, given the changing motivations and economic circumstances, the differences may be affected by both time period and client type together. For example, given similar motivations of institutional lenders in periods 1 and 3, including a variable for institutional lenders alone, may not be significant. Similarly, an RTC indicator variable may not be significant because the motivations for institutional lenders in period 2 were similar to RTC appraisals. Therefore, an interaction variable between client type and time period would consider client type and time period simultaneously and reveal significant differences as expected.
 | |
Accordingly, the explanatory power of these variables will be tested using an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). An ANCOVA model essentially combines an analysis of variance model with a regression model. ANCOVA adds another relevant variable to an analysis of variance model in an attempt to make the analysis more precise. The basic analysis of variance model compares observations that have been affected by a "treatment" against those that haven't. For example, this paper hypothesizes that the time period in which the appraisal was completed affects the differences between appraised values and sales prices. If this is true, then the mean differences for the three periods should be statistically significantly different. If they are, the statistical test (known as the F-test) will produce a large F-value. While the ANCOVA uses adjusted means to test for significant effects between treatments, the primary area of interest is whether or not the mean percentage differences are greater than or equal to zero. Based upon the agency relationships and hypothesized motivations previously discussed, t-tests will be used to evaluate the following hypotheses:
 | |
* HI: The mean percentage difference for RTC appraisals is less than 0.
* H2: The mean percentage difference for institutional lender appraisals completed between 1985-1987 is less than 0.
* H3: The mean percentage difference for institutional lender appraisals completed between 1988-1989 and 1993-1997 is greater than 0. * H4: The mean percentage difference for institutional lender appraisals completed between 1990-1992 is less than 0.
Results
As shown in Table 2, nearly all the factors produce significant effects. There is a significant relationship between the number of days adjusted and the percentage differences. The average number of days between date of appraisal and date of sale was approximately 400, or about 13 months. This is not unusual given the marketing time of a property and due diligence work needed to broker a sale.
It was assumed within the design of the model that indexing the sales price to the date of sale would explain a portion of the differences. Some of the significance of this variable may be a result of new information coming into the market and affecting sales prices and thus, differences. The purpose of including this variable is to effectively remove any variability due to sales price indexing from the model in order to assess the remaining effects of interest such as time period and lender type.
The TAX86 variable is highly significant. This is as expected, indicating that the anticipation of and reaction to the change in the tax laws produced significant effects. The "period" variable, indicating that time when the appraisal was completed, was also highly significant. This supports research findings by Webb (1994) that shows that differences can vary across time periods. The interaction between client type (RTC/Non-RTC) and time period of completion also produces a significant effect, indicating that the combination of who the appraisal is done for and when it is completed is significant.
A general linear regression model and residual diagnostics were also conducted to test the model. The variance inflation factors for the independent variables were all very close to 1, indicating a lack of multicollinearity. Additionally, residual plots were examined and no unusual pattern was revealed that would indicate a serious problem with non-constant variance.
Test of Mean Percentage Differences
The results of the t-tests are shown in Table 3. The mean percentage difference for RTC appraisals was slightly positive, or approximately 1%. Although the mean difference was positive, it is not significantly different from 0. The positive mean is not exactly what was expected, but the result tends to support the notion of a different set of agency relationships inherent in RTC appraisal assignments.
The mean percentage differences for institutional lenders were as large as expected. Although the mean percentage difference for the period immediately surrounding the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is only modestly significant, the coefficient is negative. The mean difference for lenders in the 1990-1992 period is negative, but not significantly different from 0. Finally, the mean percentage difference for the late 1980s/mid-1990s period is positive, and significantly greater than 0 as expected.
An examination of four hypothesis tests indicates that only hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 4 produced the expected results. However, hypotheses two and three produced similar results in that both were expected to show negative differences. The hypothesis test results indicate that neither mean difference is significantly different from zero, potentially indicating similar motivations affecting RTC appraisals and institutional appraisals from period 2.
Conclusions
If appraised values are truly random, they should not show systematic differences from sales prices over time. This article has examined the underlying agency relationships and the economic circumstances motivating the principals in the hotel appraisal process. The results lend support to the notion that these factors influence appraised hotel values. The regression results tend to support the significance of client type and time period in explaining the variance in the difference between appraised values and sales prices. Furthermore, the t-tests of means illustrate the differences when appraising hotels for institutional lender clients as opposed to the RTC. The results support the notion that during periods of poor economic conditions or significant legislation (i.e., FIRREA) the appraisal results are similar to those done for the RTC.
The appraisal profession has been criticized unfairly for alleged mistakes in judgment and misapplication of appraisal methodology. Continuous poor judgment and misapplication by experienced professionals seems unlikely. As one appraiser argues, "...the real estate appraiser is caught up in a process that often controls him, rather than vice versa."" Further appraisal accuracy research should examine contracting and economic incentives as opposed to focusing on methodology, standards, or ethics.
| [Sidebar] |
Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank Stan Hilchey of Lodging Host Corporation, Judy McCrate of Hospitality Valuation Services, Richard Melintz of The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and  Shaner Hotel Group for their contributions of data to this study. |
| [Footnote] |
| 1. U.S. House Committee on Government Operations, "Impact of Appraisal Problems on Real Estate Lending, Mortgage Insurance and Investment in the Secondary Market" (House Report 99-091), 1986. |
| 2. John B. Corgel and Ian A. DeRoos, "Buying High and Selling Low in the Lodging-Property Market," Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly (35:6, 1994): 33-38. |
| 3. Rebel A. Cole and Robert A. Eisenbeis, "The Role of Principal-Agent Conflicts in the 1980's Thrift Crisis," Real Estate Economics (24:2, 1996): 195-218. 4. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future (Washington, DC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1997): 152. |
| 5. Chee W. Chow and Steven 1. Rice, "Qualified Audit Opinions and Auditor Switching," The Accounting Review (April 1982): 326-335. |
| [Footnote] |
| 6. Steven Rushmore, "Ethics in Hotel Appraising," The Appraisal /ournal (July 1993): 357-363. |
| 7. Rebel A. Cole, "When are Thrift Institutions Closed? An Agency-Theoretic Model," journal of Financial Services Research (7, 1993): 283-307. |
| 8. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future, (Washington, DC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1997): 426. |
| [Footnote] |
| 9. These Ethics and Counseling Statistics were provided by the Appraisal Institute in March, 1998. |
| 10. Rebel Cole, David Guilkey, and Mike Miles, "Toward An Assessment of the Reliability of Commercial Appraisals," The Appraisal /ournal (July 1986): 422432. |
| 11. Rebel Cole, David Guilkey, and Mike Miles, "Pension Fund Investment Managers' Unit Values Deserve Confidence," Real Estate Review (17, 1987): 84-89. |
| [Footnote] |
| 12. R. Brian Webb, "On the Reliability of Commercial Appraisals: An Analysis of Properties Sold from the Russell-NCREIF Index (1978-1992)," Journal of Real Estate Finance (Spring 1994): 62-65. |
| 13. Kerry D. Vandell, "Market Analysis: Can We Do Better?," The Appraisal Journal (July 1988): 344-350. |
| 14. Stuart Fletcher and Barry Diskin, "Agency Relationships in Appraising for Institutional Asset Managers," The Appraisal/ournal (January 1994): 103-112. |
| [Footnote] |
| 15. Romain L. Klaasen, "ears Are Not Enough (One Man's View From Canada)," The Real Estate Appraiser and Analyst (Spring 1989): 32-42. |
| 16. Gerald E. Smolen and Donald Casey Hambleton, "Is the Real Estate Appraiser's Role Too Much to Expect?," The Appraisal Journal (January 1997): 9-17. |
| [Footnote] |
| 17. John Corgel and Jan DeRoos, "Pure Price Changes of Lodging Properties," The Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly (April 1992): 70-77. 18. For further information on analysis of covariance, see John Neter, William Wasserman and Michael Kutner, Applied Linear Statistical Models (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1990), chapter 23. |
| [Footnote] |
| 19. Denis M. Duvoisin, "The Appraiser in the Lending Process: An Ethical Dilemma," The Real Estate Appraiser and Analyst (Summer 1988): 16. |
| [Reference] |
| Allen, M. "Appraisers, Culprits in S&L Crisis, Are Now Key to S&L Recovery," Wall Street journal (January 24, 1990): 1, 16. |
| Chow, C., & S. Rice. "Qualified Opinions and Auditor Switching," The Accounting Review (57, 1982): 325-335. |
| Cole, R. "When Are Thrift Institutions Closed? An Agency-Theoretic Model,"Journal of Financial Services Research (7, 1993): 283-307. |
| [Reference] |
| Cole, R., & R. Eisenbeis. "The Role of PrincipalAgent Conflicts in the 1980's Thrift Crisis," Real Estate Economics (24, 1996): 195-218. |
| Cole, R., D. Guilkey, & M. Miles. "Toward an Assessment of the Reliability of Commercial Appraisals," The Appraisal Journal (July 1986): 422-432. |
| Cole, R., D. Guilkey, & M. Miles. "Pension Fund Investment Managers' Unit Values Deserve Confidence," Real Estate Review (17:1, 1987): 84-89. |
| [Reference] |
| Corgel, J., & J. DeRoos. "Pure Price Changes of Lodging Properties," The Cornell Hotel & Restaurant-Administration Quarterly (33, 1992): 70-77. |
| Corgel, J., & J. DeRoos. "Buying High and Selling Low in the Lodging-Property Market," The Cornell Hotel& Restaurant Administration Quarterly (35, 1994): 33-38. |
| DeRoos, J., & J. Corgel. "Measuring Lodging Property Performance," The Cornell Hotel 6' Restaurant Administration Quarterly (35, 1996): 20-27. |
| [Reference] |
| Demsetz, H. "The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics (7, 1964): 11-26. |
| Duvoisin, D. "The Appraiser in the Lending Process: An Ethical Dilemma." The Real Estate Appraiser andAnalyst (54:2, 1988): 15-18. |
| Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. "History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future. An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980's and Early 1990's," Washington, DC (1997). |
| Fiedler, L. "The Problem With Commercial Property Appraisals Today," Real Estate Review (25:4, 1996): 33-36. |
| Fletcher, S., & B. Diskin. "Agency Relationships in Appraising for Institutional Managers," The Appraisal Journal (January 1994):103-112. |
| Grossman, R. "Deposit Insurance, Regulation and Moral Hazard in the Thrift Industry: Evidence from the 1930's," The American Economic Review (82, 1991): 800-821. |
| Hendershott, P. & E. Kane. "U.S. Office Market Values During the Past Decade: How Distorted Have Appraisals Been?" Real Estate Economics (23, 1995): 101-116. |
| Jensen, M., & W Meckling. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics (3, 1976): 305-360. |
| [Reference] |
| Klassen, R. "Tears Are Not Enough (One Man's View From Canada)," The Real Estate Appraiser and Analyst (55, 1989): 32-42. |
| McKelvy, N. Pension Fund Investments in Real Estate: A Guide for Plan Sponsors and Real Estate Professionals, Westport, CT: Quorum (1983). |
| Neter, J., W Wasserman, & M. Kutner. Applied Linear Statistical Models (3rd Edition). Homewood, IL: Irwin (1990). |
| Park, S. "Explanations for the Increased Riskiness of Banks in the 1980's," Economic Review (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) (76:4, 1994): 3-23. |
| Petuck, S. "Appraisers, Ethics, and Conflict of Interest," Real Estate Review (26:2, 1996): 76-80. Quan, D., & J. Quigley. "Price Formation and the |
| Appraisal Function in Real Estate Markets," Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics (4:1, 1991): 27-146. |
| Rudolph, P "Will Bad Appraisals Drive Out Good?" The Appraisal journal (July 1994):363-366. Rushmore, S. "Ethics in Hotel Appraising," The |
| Appraisal journal (July 1993): 357-363. Smolen, G., & D. Hambleton. "Is the Real Estate Appraiser's Role too Much to Expect?" The Appraisal journal (January 1997): 9-17. |
| U.S. House Committee on Government Operations. "Impact of Appraisal Problems on Real Estate Lending, Mortgage Insurance, and Investment in the Secondary Market," (House Report 99-091). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (1986). |
| Vandell, K. "Market Analysis: Can We Do Better?" The Appraisal journal(56, 1988): 344-350. Webb, R. "On the Reliability of Commercial Real |
| Estate Appraisals: An Analysis of Properties Sold From the NCREIF Index (1978-1992)," Real Estate Finance (11:1994): 62-65. |
| [Author Affiliation] |
| by Michael Dalbor, PhD /Y |
| [Author Affiliation] |
| Michael Dalbor, PhD, is a former commercial real estate appraiser and an assistant professor at |
| the University of Nevada Las Vegas. He received his BS and PhD degrees from The Pennsylvania State University and a MBA degree from Loyola College in Maryland. He has published articles in the journal of |
| Hospitality and Tourism Research, the International Journal of Hospitality Management, and the journal of Hospitality Financial Management. |
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